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STREET DIVERSION AND DECARCERATION
Mary Fan*
ABSTRACT
States seeking more cost-effective approaches than imprisoning drug offenders
have explored innovations such as drug courts and deferred prosecution. These
treatment-based programs generally involve giving diversion discretion to prosecu-
tors and judges, actors further down the criminal processing chain than police. The
important vantage of police at the gateway of entry into the criminal system has
been underutilized. The article explores developing the capacity of police to take a
public health approach to drug offending by engaging in street diversion to
treatment rather than criminal processing. This approach entails giving police
therapeutic discretion-the power to sort who gets treatment rather than enters the
criminal justice system. The article draws insights from medicine and the experi-
ence of treatment courts about how to guide therapeutic discretion, mitigate the
risk of racial disparities in selection of beneficiaries, and offer checks and balances
on power.
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INTRODUCTION
Today is a green light day in an experimental new role for police in dealing with
drug offenders in urban Seattle.' In a program called "the first of its kind in the
United States," police officers in the downtown Belltown area take drug and
prostitution offenders-among the main staples of the criminal justice mill-to
rehabilitative and social support services rather than criminal processing on select
days.2 The program also treats prostitution as a divertible offense because of the
community's understanding that while male addicts are often arrested for drug
offenses, female addicts are often picked up for prostitution. 3 The police-
community partnership project is called LEAD-short for Law Enforcement
1. "Green-light days" is the term officers implementing the program use to refer to days when they may choose
to divert people to rehab rather than arrest. See LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTED DIVERSION (LEAD), BELLTOWN
REFERRAL AND DIVERSION PROTOCOL-FINAL 2 (2011) [hereinafter LEAD Protocol] (document on file with author)
(explaining protocol for diversion).
2. See LEARNING FOR ACTION (LFA) GROUP, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTED DIVERSION (LEAD) PROGRAM AND
EVALUATION PLAN 1 (Oct. 2011) [hereinafter LEAD Plan] (document on file with author) (explaining the "model
has not been tried yet in the US" and explaining the ambition that the idea will spread to other jurisdictions); Levi
Pulkkinen, "A New Day" for Belltown, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER (Oct. 13, 2011), http://www.seattlepi.com/
local/article/A-new-day-for-Belltown-2217385.php (describing program as "the first program of its kind in the
United States").
3. For studies on the interrelationship between addiction and prostitution, see, e.g., Jennifer James, Prostitu-
tion and Addiction: An Interdisciplinary Approach, 2 ADDICTIVE DISEASES: AN INT'L J. 601, 601-03, 615 (1976)
(exploring the connection between prostitution and addiction); John J. Potterat et al., Pathways to Prostitution:
The Chronology of Sexual and Drug Abuse Milestones, 35 J. SEX RESEARCH 333, 339 (1998) (finding substance
abuse generally precedes entry into prostitution); Amy M. Young, Carol Boyd & Amy Hubbell, Prostitution, Drug
Use, and Coping with Psychological Distress, 30 J. DRUG ISSUES 789, 789-800, 795-97 (2000) (collecting
findings that women may enter prostitution to fund drug use and arguing the stress of prostitution intensifies drug
dependence). For a thought-provoking argument about the similarities in supply-side criminal regulation of drugs
(Vol. 50:165
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Assisted Diversion, and an acronym that also captures the hope that the pioneering
approach might flourish and spread to other jurisdictions.4
The need for wiser approaches to dealing with drug offending is acute. Drug
offenses constitute the most prevalent ground for arrest and a major basis of
imprisonment in the United States.5 Over the last two decades, incarceration has
quadrupled and spending on prisons has surged by more than 300 percent, but
recidivism has stuck to between 43 percent and 45.4 percent.6 In a microcosm of
the national problem, police working Belltown's open-air drug markets reported
just 54 repeat offenders accounted for 2,700 arrests.7 The addicts, pushers, and
prostitutes chum through the criminal justice system, from the streets, to arrest, to
jail, in seemingly futile repetition.8 Hoping to break out of this costly cycle, the
LEAD program gives officers the discretion not to arrest and book as usual.9
Rather than acting as the muscular arm of the incarcerating state, police serve as
the first screen of an offender's suitability for rehabilitation and community
reintegration.
Call it street diversion away from the system's standard answer of arrest and jail
for drug offenders. The idea is to take a "public health approach" to the problem of
persistent reoffending. Officers explain that the role change is a "cultural shift" and
an institutional reorientation for policing.,o This Article is about cultivating such a
public health approach to policing drug offenders and designing safeguards for
police discretion to divert at the street level.
The opening example of a program in part of downtown Seattle may seem
hyper-local-but the embryo of a big idea in a microcosm is chosen as an emblem
of greater possibilities. After all, one of the major criminal justice innovations over
the last three decades, drug courts, started as a hyper-local Miami program." The
idea that began in miniature-treatment courts casting judges and prosecutors in
rehabilitative roles-has since spurred a massive movement, with more than 2,500
programs across the United States and broad bipartisan support today.12 The
and prostitution see, for example, Donald A. Dripps, Recreational Drug Regulation: A Plea for Responsibility,
2009 UTAH L. REV. 117, 120-21 (2009).
4. LEAD Plan, supra note 2, at 1.
5. See, e.g., FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORM CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2009, at I (Sept. 2010), http://
www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/documents/arrestmain.pdf (reporting the highest arrest counts for drug abuse viola-
tions); infra, Part I.A. (discussing figures); see also JOHN SCHMITT ET AL., CTR. FOR ECON. AND POL'Y RESEARCH,
THE HIGH BUDGETARY COST OF INCARCERATION 2, 4-5 & fig.2 (2010), http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications
incarceration-2010-06.pdf (providing comparative per capita incarceration rates).
6. See THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, STATE OF RECIDIVISM: THE REVOLVING DOOR OF AMERICA'S PRISON 2,5,
9, 12 (April 2011).
7. See, e.g., Pulkkinen supra note 2, at Al.
8. See, e.g., Sara Jean Green, Seattle program aims to break the habit of incarceration, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 13,
2011, at A l (describing "collective fatigue" over revolving cycle).
9. LEAD Protocol, supra note 1, at 2.
10. Pulkkinen supra note 2, atAl.
11. See discussion infra notes 81-83.
12. Id.
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Article argues for extending our reimagination of traditional criminal justice
institutional roles to a crucial and underutilized actor in forging therapeutic
alternatives to incarceration-the police who stand at the entryway to the criminal
justice system.13
Street diversion by police has the potential to help cut costs, reduce prison
overcrowding, and promote long-term solutions to public health and order prob-
lems.1 4 Converging conditions have created an opportune time to develop a
rehabilitative role for policing. 15 States and localities are engaged in a widespread
search for ways to decarcerate and relieve crushing budgetary pressures. 16 For the
first time in more than three decades, the number of people incarcerated declined in
2010.17 Though the decline was slight-0.3 percent-it was an important change
in trend.' 8 Many criminal justice reforms are making headway, particularly those
tackling the system's approach to drug offenses.' 9 Indeed, in a marked shift from
the tough-on-crime politics of the past, states are showing political will to reform
the punitive orientation toward drug offenses through legislation converting drug
felonies to misdemeanors and curbing sentences.20
The notion of police participation in therapeutic sorting is not wholly foreign to
the United States. Rehabilitative policing models have evolved in the context of
pre-booking diversion of the mentally ill to cope with the deinstitutionalization of
mental institutions. 21 This Article explores the most viable model for the spread of
rehabilitative diversion and argues that police-driven sorting by specially trained
officers is the most practicable option. 2 The challenge is how to cultivate the
benefits of rehabilitative policing while allaying concerns over giving police
discretion to determine who gets treatment rather than jail. The policing literature
is filled with concerns and cautions regarding police discretion, including the
13. See infra Part I.B.
14. Id.
15. See infra Part I.A.
16. Id.
17. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, BULL. NCJ236096,
PRISONERS IN 2010, at 1 (2012).
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., Cheryl Cadue, Budget Cuts Challenge Progress Made by States and Elicit Even Smarter Reforms,
ALLBUSINESS (Feb. 1, 2010), http://www.allbusiness.com/crime-law-enforcement-corrections/corrections-
parole/14359499-I.html (offering examples of reforms); State Measures to Close Budget Gaps, NAT'L CONFER-
ENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (2011), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/budget/state-measures-to-close-budget-
gaps.aspx (providing a database of state criminal justice reforms).
20. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-18-401(b), (c) (2011) (converting drug felony to misdemeanor); id. at
§1818-18-406 (reducing sentences for a variety of other simple possession crimes); Carrie Teegardin & Bill
Rankin, Georgia Rethinks Its Prison Stance, ATLANTA J. -CONST., Jan. 3, 2012, at AI (reporting on recommenda-
tions by legislatively-convened expert body that would, among other things, offer probation for most drug
possession offenses); Jimmie E. Gates, Inmates get early release, CLARION-LEDGER (Miss.), Nov. 29, 2009,
available at 2009 WLNR 24110992 (reporting on reform to increase the number of nonviolent drug offenders on
house arrest rather than parole); see also infra Part I.A. 1.
21. See infra Part l.A.
22. See infra Part lI.A-B.
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discretion to be lenient.23 Giving therapeutic discretion to the police rather than
prosecutors or judges raises concerns regarding the low visibility of police
decision-making on the street, information deficits, the hidden impact of uncon-
scious bias, and the lack of cross-institutional checks. 4 The Article argues these
are not insurmountable impediments. The benefits of rehabilitative policing
outweigh the concerns if mitigating measures are taken.
The dilemmas of discretion are not unique to policing. This Article argues the
experience of other professions exercising therapeutic judgment can inform ways
to ameliorate concerns about police therapeutic discretion. For example, public
health studies have found a host of apparent disparities in the treatments doctors
prescribe for the same ailment depending on the patient's race. The medical
community has explored ways to improve therapeutic discretion, offering insights
about how to counteract unconscious biases that influence judgment and decision-
making, 26 use data-driven monitoring as a check on judgment,27 and improve
decision-making based on observations and questioning during brief encounters
through communication education.2 8 Drawing on insights from medical literature
on discretion and disparities, this Article provides recommendations on mitigating
the dilemmas of discretion in rehabilitative policing.
23. See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 83-88 (1969) (discussing
the dangers of discretionary justice, including police discretion to be lenient); RONALD WELTER & STEVEN A.
TUCH, RACE AND POLICING IN AMERICA: CONFLICT AND REFORM 3 (2006) (discussing how police discretion not to
arrest sparks concern over selective enforcement). For more sources, see infra discussion at notes 162-163.
24. See infra Part I1.B.2.
25. See, e.g., BRIAN D. SMEDLEY ET AL., INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL
AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE 160-79 (2003) (collecting circumstantial evidence of biases impacting
treatment decisions); Peter A. Clark, Prejudice and the Medical Profession: A Five-Year Update, 37 J. L. MED. &
ETHICS 118, 118-24 (2009) (collecting an array of study findings); Alexander R. Green et al., Implicit Bias Among
Physicians and its Prediction of Thrombolysis Decisions for Black and White Patients, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED.
1231, 1237 (2007) [hereinafter Alexander R. Green et al.] (finding implicit bias influences physician decisions on
whether to prescribe thrombolysis, a clot-busting treatment, for patients with myocardial infarction); Carmen R.
Green et al., The Unequal Burden of Pain: Confronting Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Pain, 4 PAIN MED. 277,
278-79, 287 (2003) [hereinafter Carmen R. Green et al.] (collecting evidence of disparities based on patient race
in how and whether doctors manage pain); see also, e.g., Elizabeth Cohen, Does your doctor judge you based on
your color?, CNN News, July 23, 2009 (summarizing studies demonstrating that race and appearance, such as
obesity, impact physician perception and judgment); Rahul K. Parikh, Race and the White Coat, SALON, Apr. 22,
2008 (summarizing research finding that adjusting for income, age, insurance status and disease severity,
physicians treat patients disparately depending on race); Black and Hispanic Patients with chest pain often
downgraded in ER, CARDIOLOGY TODAY, Oct. 25, 2010, at 23 (reporting emergency triage units were less likely to
prioritize Hispanic and Black patients presenting with chest pain than white patient and less likely to order an
electrocardiogram, cardiac monitor or pulse oximetry).
26. For an overview of the phenomenon of implicit bias and how to detect it see, for example, Anthony G.
Greenwald & Mahzarin Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCH.
REV. 4, 19-20 (1995); Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations,
94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 947-53 (2006). For a sampling of the abundant array of literature applying insights on
implicit bias to law and legal decision makers, see infra note 169.
27. See infra Part III.A.2.
28. See infra Part III.A.3.
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The analysis proceeds in three parts. Part I frames the need for rehabilitative
policing, particularly in how the United States deals with drug offenders. This Part
analyzes how the costs and ravages of the drug war are producing converging
interests between majorities and minorities for change and have spurred reforms.
Part II explores models for rehabilitative policing, drawing from experiments in
therapeutic sorting among police departments dealing with the deinstitutionaliza-
tion of mental hospitals. This Part concludes that ultimately a model based on
trained officer sorting rather than a team of police and behavioral health profession-
als is the most practicable method of integrating street diversion into standard
practice. The analysis acknowledges the dilemmas of giving police rehabilitative
discretion, but argues a model that gives police rather than specialized experts the
power is needed to effect change in everyday criminal law. Part III offers answers
to potential objections to police discretion, drawing on medical literature on
treatment biases and the experiences of drug courts.
I. WHY REHABILITATIVE POLICING AND WHY Now?
Across the nation, states are searching for ways to cut the crippling costs of
punitive criminal processing as usual without endangering safety.29 With growing
bipartisan support, 30 American criminal justice is starting to come out of the long
hangover of the punitive turn after the decline of the rehabilitative ideal-the loss
of faith in the hope of reforming offenders-and the launch of the war on drugs in
the 1970s. 31 Across the political spectrum 32 people are realizing the urgent need to
29. See, e.g., Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., The "Smart on Crime" Prosecutor, 25 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 905, 906-908
(2012) (discussing the smart on crime movement); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., From Overcriminalization to "Smart
on Crime": American Criminal Justice Reform-Legacy and Prospects, 7 J. L. ECON. & POL'Y 597, 611-612
(2011) (discussing shifting criminal justice reform impetus); Mary D. Fan, Beyond Budget-Cut Criminal Justice:
The Future of Penal Law, 90 N. CAROLINA L. REV. 581, 594-95, 610-11, 619-20 (2012) (detailing budgetary
emergencies and the search for reforms); Monica Davey, Safety Is Issue as Budget Cuts Free Prisoners,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2010, at A1 (describing numerous state criminal justice reforms trying to redress budgetary
shortfalls).
30. See, e.g., Debi Brazzale, Lawmakers Unite Behind New Approach to Drug Offenders, STATE BILL NEWS
(Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.statebillnews.com/2010/02/hbl0-1352-lawmakers-unite-behind-new-approach-to-
drug-offenders/ (quoting Republican legislator and former prosecutor's explanation that "[iut's time to switch our
focus from being tough on crime to being smart on crime" as his reason for bipartisan support of legislation that
reduces penalties for drug crimes); Mike Klein, Thinking Outside the Cell: Texas Innovates to Correct Course in
Prison System, GA. PUB. PoL'Y FOUND. (Apr. 20, 2010), http://www.georgiapolicy.orglthinking-outside-the-cell-
texas-innovates-to-correct-course-in-prison-system/ (quoting Republican Texas legislator's explanation for sup-
port of rehabilitation rather than prison: "You're not soft on crime by doing something that's smart"); Alan
Johnson, Sentencing-overhaul law to reduce Ohio's prison population, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (June 30, 2011, 6:18
AM), available at http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2011/06/30/sentencing-overhaul-to-reduce-prison-
population.html (discussing shift in stance by longstanding Republican crime crackdown proponent because of
the realization that the 1980s vision of incarceration and toughness was not working).
31. For accounts of the decline of the rehabilitative ideal see, e.g., FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE
REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE 18-19 (1981); DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF
CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CoNTEMPoRARYSoCIErY 8-20,28-73,90-102, 105-37 (2002); JONATHAN
SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: How THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND
[Vol. 50:165
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disrupt the status quo of penal severity and what Joan Petersilia has memorably
termed "the prison bubble., 33 The nation is more receptive-even hungry-now
than at any point in the last four decades to find "more humane, effective
alternatives" that "fundamentally rethink how we treat and rehabilitate our
prisoners. 34 It may come as a surprise that the foregoing quotation came from
Newt Gingrich-long considered a "hardcore conservative"-rather than a liberal
reformer.35 The lack of controversy surrounding such a policy platform shows how
much the nation is coming to embrace the need for decarceration and breaking free
of the once-seemingly inescapable one-way ratchet of get-tough crime politics.
The need to cut costs is changing the social meaning of reform and overcoming
status quo bias when it comes to policy change.36
Although status quo bias remains a challenge for street diversion efforts, the
high costs of incarceration and the emergence of new ways to ensure safety are
creating the broad constituency needed for change.37 Status quo bias is particularly
difficult for decarceration reform because individual winners and losers cannot be
precisely specified in advance.38 Since many people assume the winners will be
CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 149-51 (2007). For works on the impact of the War on Drugs on American criminal
justice and communities across America, see, e.g., R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing and the
Drug War, 56 STAN. L. REV. 571, 573, 587-88, 594 (2003) (analyzing how blacks and Latinos pay a
disproportionate tax in terms of subjection to greater burdens of investigation because of the war on drugs);
Steven B. Duke, Mass Imprisonment, Crime Rates, and the Drug War: A Penological and Humanitarian
Disgrace, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 17, 17, 23-24, 28 (2009) (discussing the impact of the long war on drugs,
declared in 1973 by President Richard Nixon, on the 800 percent surge in imprisonment over the last forty years);
Tracey L. Meares, Social Organization and Drug Law Enforcement, 35 Am. CRiM. L. REV. 191, 194, 206-13
(1998) (analyzing how the war on drugs and its heavy impact on disadvantaged communities has contributed to
social disorganization, disrupting the community bonds needed to prevent lawbreaking).
32. See, e.g., Newt Gingrich & Pat Nolan, Saving Money, Saving Lives, WASH POST, Jan. 7, 2011, at A17,
available at 2011 WLNR 1530349 (discussing need "to address the astronomical growth in the prison population,
with its huge costs in dollars and lost human potential").
33. Joan Petersilia, Beyond the Prison Bubble, 35 WILSON Q. 52 (Winter 2011).
34. Gingrich & Nolan, supra note 32, atA17.
35. See, e.g., Republicans and the Crime Bill, CAL. J., Oct. 1, 1994, available at 1994 WLNR 5362177
(terming Gingrich a "hardcore conservative"); Robert L. Koenig, Gingrich Gets High GOP Post, ST. LoUis
POsT-DISPATCH, Mar. 23, 1989, at IA, available at 1989 WLNR 374842 (describing Democratic concerns over
Gingrich's "highly partisan style").
36. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, What's Really Wrong with Shaming Sanctions, 84 TEx. L. REV. 2075, 2079 (2006)
(discussing how status quo bias impedes receptivity to good ideas in criminal justice reform); William Samuelson
& Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decisionmaking, I J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 8-11, 41 (reporting
experimental findings of strong status quo bias in a variety of decisionmaking contexts).
37. See, e.g., John Buntin, How Game Theory is Reinventing Crime Fighting, GOVERNING (Feb. 2012),
available at http://www.goveming.com/topics/public-justice-safety/gov-how-game-theory-is-reinventing-crine-
fighting.html (discussing how budget deficits and the desire to pursue smarter and more effective policies to
handle non-violent offenders are driving reforms among the states); Fan, supra note 29, at 583, 623-624
(analyzing the power of the social meaning shift).
38. See, e.g., Raquel M. Fernandez & Dani Rodrik, Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of
Individual-Specific Uncertainty, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 1146, 1146, 1152-54 (1991) (offering a model of ex ante
status quo bias against efficiency-enhancing reforms that might otherwise be quite popular and successful ex post
where individual gainers and losers under the change cannot be precisely identified ex ante).
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offenders, they worry the community will be left unsafe.3 9 Status quo bias is also
politically challenging because decarceration reforms primarily benefit marginal-
ized and disadvantaged communities that lack the political power to effectuate
legal change. The discrete and insular minority difficulty in democratically
determined criminal law compounds the status quo bias against reform.40 Appeals
for reforms couched in terms of harms to disadvantaged communities and the
incarcerated have difficulty gaining political traction because the perceived benefi-
ciaries are people lacking the power to secure change. But conversion of the
concern to the language of costs to taxpayers and smarter ways to ensure safety is
creating the broader constituency needed for change.
Numbers are creating a compelling case that reform would benefit the majority,
both in terms of costs savings and because the odds of getting caught up in the
criminal system have dramatically risen. Today, one in thirty-three adults bears the
brand of correctional control, either in jail, in prison, on probation, or on parole.4 '
Such high rates make it harder to delude oneself that criminal processing happens
to other people and one is immune. To sustain the highest reported per capita
incarceration rate in the world, Americans spent $68 billion on prisons in 2008, a
336 percent increase in costs since 1980.42 Spending on prisons has become the
nation's second fastest growing general fund expenditure draining money away
from basic priorities such as education.43 As two-thirds of states faced nearly $40
billion in budget gaps collectively in fiscal year 2009-a gap that soared to $84.3
billion by fiscal year 201044-1egislators are confronting the heavy costs of
incarceration.45
What areas of reform will yield the most impact? This section first analyzes why
a smarter model of drug policing is a compelling entryway for reform. Drug abuse
offenses constitute the biggest basis for arrest in the United States, accounting for
39. For accounts of how the fear of looking soft on crime and accusations of endangering safety have stymied
reform, see, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Essential but Inherently Limited Role of the Courts in Prison Reform,
13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 307, 310 (2008); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law's Disappearing
Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REv. 2548, 2558 (2004); Michael Tonry, The Mostly Unintended Effects of Mandatory
Penalties: Two Centuries of Consistent Findings, 38 CRIME & JUST. 65, 100-02 (2009).
40. See William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 21
(1996) (explaining countermajoritarian judicially-fashioned criminal procedure protections as vindicating the
Carolene Products vision of protecting minorities lacking recourse in the political process).
41. LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 236319, CORRECTIONAL POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES,
2010, at 2 (2011).
42. THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 3 1: THE LONG REACH OF AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 11 (2009). The
United States incarcerates 753 people per 100,000 of the population, whereas second-place Russia incarcerates
629 per 100,000, and Rwanda incarcerates 593 per 100,000. JOHN SCHMIrT ET AL., CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY
RESEARCH, THE HIGH BUDGETARY COST OF INCARCERATION 4 (2010).
43. CHRISTINE S. SCOTT-HAYWARD, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE FISCAL CRISIS IN CORRECTIONS: RETHINKING
POLICIES AND PRACTICES 3 (2009), http://www.vera.org/fileslh-fiscal-crisis-in-correctionsJuly-2009.pdf.
44. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGS., UPDATE ON STATE BUDGET GAPS: FY 2009 & FY 2010, at 2-3 (2009).
45. See supra notes 29, 39.
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more than 1.6 million arrests in 2009.46 Drug offenses are also the leading basis for
incarceration in the federal system and one of the major bases for imprisonment
across the states. 47 Across the nation, bipartisan coalitions are exploring reforms to
drug laws and punishment as an important part of the reform package.48 Majority
and minority interests are converging in seeking change to drug offender process-
ing as usual because of the drug war's ravages. The second section argues that the
vision of change should widen from rehabilitative courts to rehabilitative policing,
providing the threshold decision maker with the ability to divert people before
incurring the costs of criminal processing.
A. Seeking Smarter Solutions to the Drug War
As states break free from criminal processing as usual, changes to how the
system punishes drug offenders have become an important part of reform pack-
ages.49 In 2011, at least nine states enacted drug law reforms, which ranged from
lowering the prescribed penalties for use and possession offenses, to widening
access to substance abuse programs. 50 The National Conference of State Legisla-
tures forecasts that criminal justice reforms, including drug law reforms, will
continue to be a top issue for state legislatures in 2012.51 Narcotics offenses are
often a focal point for states seeking to cut the steep costs of incarceration because
drug offenses are a major driver of incarceration.52 Moreover, studies indicate that
imprisonment has a particularly strong criminogenic effect on drug offenders, who
recidivate more rapidly and at higher rates after incarceration than similarly
situated offenders who receive only probation.53
Reform supporters-including conservatives-have realized incarceration as
usual is not working and costs too much. For example, Republican legislator and
former prosecutor Mike Waller, successfully sponsored legislation in Colorado to
46. FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT, supra note 5, at 1.
47. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2010, supra note 17, at 28 tbl. 16B, 30 tbl. 18.
48. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 20 and discussion infra Part IA.
49. See, e.g., Jeremy W. Peters, Albany Reaches Deal to Repeal '70s Drug Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2009, at
Al (heralding revisions to tough 1970s era drug laws); Teegardin & Rankin, supra note 20, at Al (detailing how
conservative Southern states are engaging in criminal justice reforms under the "smart on crime" banner,
including drug law reforms); Top 12 Legislative Issues of 2012 NCSL Highlights Some of the Top Issues that Will
Dominate the Legislative Agenda in 2012, STATES NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 3, 2012, available at http://www.ncsl.org/
press-room/top-12-legislative-issues-of-2012.aspx [hereinafter Top 12 Legislative Issues of 2012] (reporting on
strong state interest in drug law and sentencing reform).
50. Top 12 Legislative Issues of 2012, supra note 49.
51. Id.
52. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2010, supra note 17, at 28 tbl. 16B, 30 tbl. 18 (listing major crime
categories accounting for imprisonment).
53. Cassia Spohn & David Holleran, The Effect of Imprisonment on Recidivism Rates of Felony Offenders: A
Focus on Drug Offenders, 40 CRIMINOLOGY 329, 330, 345 (2002).
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adopt a treatment rather than incarceration paradigm for addicts.54 He explained
the rationale for his bill by stating, "warehousing people who are addicts doesn't
do anything to solve the problem.",55 The new legislation also converts some
narcotics-related crimes from felonies to misdemeanors and requires annual cost
savings evaluations and allocation of savings to substance abuse treatment
programs.5 6
Georgia, which has one of the top ten highest per capita incarceration rates in the
nation, is also joining other conservative southern states in exploring criminal
justice reform, including drug law reform.57 Trying to cut annual costs of more
than $1 billion for incarceration-primarily for drug and property offenders-state
lawmakers enacted House Bill 265, establishing the Special Council on Criminal
Justice Reform.58 The Special Council reported that Georgia's incarceration costs
were skyrocketing even as crime declined, largely fueled by drug and property
offenses, which constituted the most common bases of prison admissions.59
Though many drug and property offenders are lower-risk, the average length of
prison stay among such offenders more than tripled between 1990 and 2010,
fueling crushing incarceration costs. 60 The Special Council expressed concern that
incarceration heightens the risk of recidivism, particularly for felony drug offend-
ers.61 While controversial, some of the further-reaching drug law reforms consid-
ered by the Special Council included presumptive probation for drug possession
offenses and giving judges the discretion to depart from drug offense mandatory
62minimums.
54. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-18-401(b)-(c) (2011) ("Successful, community-based substance abuse treat-
ment and education programs, in conjunction with mental health treatment as necessary, provide effective tools in
the effort to reduce drug usage and criminal behavior in communities. Therapeutic intervention and ongoing
individualized treatment plans prepared through the use of meaningful and proven assessment tools and
evaluations offer a potential alternative to incarceration in appropriate circumstances and should be utilized
accordingly.").
55. Jeffrey Wolfe, Lawmakers Propose Changes to Drug Sentencing, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 23, 2010,
available at http://www.9news.comnews/local/story.aspx?storyid= 133332&catid=346.
56. H.B. 10-1352, 67th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2010) (referencing amendments to sections
18-18-404, 16-11.5-102 of the Colorado Revised Statutes).
57. See, e.g., Teegardin & Rankin, supra note 20, at Al (reporting Georgia is joining other conservative
Southern states in exploring criminal justice reforms); The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Incarceration Rate
(Per 100,000 Residents), 2010, STATEHEALTHFACTS.ORG, http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparemaptable.jsp?
ind=760&cat= 1 (last visited Nov. 20, 2012) (based on 2010 U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics and U.S. Census
Bureau data).
58. Bill Rankin, Panel Recommends Reforms to Stem Prison Spending, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 18, 2011, at
Al.
59. SPECIAL COUNCIL ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM FOR GEORGIANS, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COUNCIL ON
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM FOR GEORGIANS 9 (2011).
60. Id. at 19.
61. Id. at 10, 20 (citing Spohn & Holleran, supra note 53, at 329-58).
62. Id. at 24-25.
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The reforms represent a remarkable potential shift in criminal justice politics.
For decades, scholars and civil rights litigators have decried the consequences of
the drug war, particularly for communities of color, which bear the heaviest burden
of investigation and incarceration.6 The very fact that the drug war has had severe
racial consequences may explain why political will has long been lacking to do
something. A majoritarian system has a hard time protecting the interests of
minorities. 64 Risks of looking soft on crime compound these political concerns.
65
What is turning the tide, ultimately, has been a conversion of the critique to
majoritarian concerns of costs of incarceration.6 6 Interest convergence between
majorities and minorities can spark change where appeals to normative commit-
ments such as anti-subordination have difficulty making headway.
67
When viewed through the lens of incarceration costs, majority and minority
interests are converging. In 1995, Michael Tonry wrote that drug offenses are "the
63. For just a sampling of the rich literature, see, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 6-7, 47-49, 53, 59 (2010) (arguing the war on drugs has
perpetuated mass incarceration of minorities, continuing racial subordination by other means); Banks, supra note
31, at 594 (discussing how harms typically decried as racial profiling may stem from drug law enforcement);
Steven B. Duke, Drug Prohibition: An Unnatural Disaster, 27 CONN. L. REV. 571, 575-95 (1995) (cataloguing
the myriad consequences of the drug war, such as creating criminogenic incentives to commit collateral crimes,
urban blight, heavy incarceration, dilution of civil liberties, and gross disparities in criminal law enforcement);
Meares, supra note 31, at 204-17 (analyzing the collateral consequences of the drug war for social disorganiza-
tion, particularly in disadvantaged communities of color); Ethan A. Nadelmann, Commonsense Drug Policy, 77
FOREIGN Avv. 111, 115-16 (1998) (detailing public health consequences such as transfer of disease through dirty
syringes and arguing for a harm-reduction approach to containing the consequences of addiction); Kenneth B.
Nunn, Race, Crime and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why the "War on Drugs "' was a "War on Blacks," 6 1.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 381, 384-88 (2002) (arguing the war on drugs is a mask for a race war); John A. Powell &
Eileen B. Hershenov, Hostage to the Drug War: The National Purse, the Constitution and the Black Community,
24 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 557, 580-614 (1991) (arguing the casualties of the drug war are constricted constitutional
protections against search and seizure and communities of color). Cf, e.g., DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, DRUGS AND
RIGHTS 1-7, 42-50 (1992) (arguing that beyond social cost arguments for drug law reform, drug law prohibitions
violate the individual moral rights of adults who wish to use drugs for pleasure).
64. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). See discussion supra text at notes 39-40.
65. On the politics of crime, see, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 39, at 310; William J. Stuntz, The Pathological
Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 509-12, 529-39 (2001); Stuntz, supra note 39, at 2558; Tonry,
supra note 39, at 100-02.
66. For a discussion, see supra text and sources at notes 41-48.
67. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest- Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523, 530 (1980) (arguing progress toward racial equality "will be accommodated
only when it converges with the interests of whites" and appeals to normative commitments do not suffice); Mary
D. Fan, Post-Racial Proxies: Resurgent State and Local Anti- "Alien" Law and Unity-Rebuilding Frames for
Antidiscrimination Values, 32 CARDOZO L. REv. 905, 908-10, 939-40 (2011) (arguing for alternate frames for
antidiscrimination values to make shared interests rather than divergence of interests salient to successfully
protect the values); Cynthia Lee, Cultural Convergence: Interest Convergence Theory Meets the Cultural
Defense, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 911, 922-38 (2007) (analyzing examples demonstrating the power of interest
convergence to drive progress); Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1937-38 (2000) (arguing
for shifting discourse on work-related rights to a focus on rights for all rather than particular marginalized groups
to achieve progress).
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single most important cause of the trebling of the prison population in the United
States since 1980. "68 As illustrated in Table 1, drug offenses continue to be the
leading basis for state incarceration. The estimated $47 billion states spent on
corrections in fiscal year 2008 is a 303 percent surge in spending over the last
twenty years and the second-fastest growing general-fund expenditure. 69 Housing
just one of the more than one-third of a million prisoners incarcerated for drug
offenses in 2009 cost nearly $29,000 a year.70
The federalization of drug prosecution and subsequent swelling of federal
incarceration for drug offenses have only intensified the burden. 7' As of January
2012, nearly half (47.7 percent) of federal incarceration was due to drug of-
fenses.72 Drug offenses were also the largest basis of conviction for white and
black people in the federal system.7 3 For the Hispanic community, only immigra-
tion offenses exceeded drug offenses in federal convictions.74 The human toll of
dealing with drugs through incarceration thus cuts across racial groups, in addition
to the shared fiscal burdens of incarceration.
The surging monetary and human costs over decades of incarceration since the
launch of the drug war have not bought a sense of improved progress in dealing
with drugs. As depicted in Charts 1 and 2, in the nearly four decades since
President Richard Nixon announced the "all-out, global war on the drug menace"
in 1973,75 public perception of progress gained have remained generally dim-and
even decreased slightly in recent years.
The percentage of people believing much progress has been made was a
miniscule three percent in 1972, before the launch of the drug war, and remains so
68. MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT-RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 81 (1995).
69. THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 31, supra note 42, at 11.
70. Id. at 12.
71. For a sampling of the critiques of surging federal drug prosecutions, see, e.g., Considering the Role of
Judges Under the Constitution of the United States Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 112 th Cong. 25 (2011)
(statement of Justice Antonin Scalia) (testifying: "It was a great mistake to put routine drug offenses into the
federal courts"); Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper Limits for
Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 997-98 (1995) (discussing problems with overcriminaliza-
tion, including nearly complete overlap in federal jurisdiction with state jurisdiction over drug offenses); Vikrant
P. Reddy, l0th Amendment Applies to Criminal Justice, Too, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 15, 2012, http://www.law.com/jsp/
nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202542435200&thAmendmentappliesjtocriminal-justicetoo&slreturn=1 (ar-
guing for the federal government to back out of drug enforcement because it should usually be the domain of the
states).
72. Federal Bureau of Prisons, Quick Facts about the Bureau of Prisons: Type of Offenses, BOP.Gov (last
updated Oct. 27, 2012), http://www.bop.gov/news/quick.jsp.
73. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2010 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.4 (2010),
http://www.ussc.gov/Data-and-Statistics/Annual-Reports-and-Sourcebooks/2010/TableO4.pdf.
74. Id.
75. PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING REORGA-
NIZATION PLAN No. 2 OF 1973 ESTABLISHING A DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, H.R. Doc. No. 93-69, at 3
(1973).
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Chart 1: Trends in Positive Responses from Selected Years 1972-2011: Public
Perceptions of the National Progress in Coping with Illegal Drugs
76
The Gallup Poll responses were elicted by the question "Now, how much progress do you feel
the nation has made over the last year or two in coping with the problem of illegal drugs-has it
made much progress, made some progress, stood still, lost some ground, or lost much ground?"
45
40 Trends in
35, Positive
30 Perceptions
25
20 --- Made Much Progress
15 ]-'=Made Some Progress
10
5
0
1972 1974 1976 1995 1996 1999 2000 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011
Chart 2: Trends in Negative Responses from Selected Years 1972-2011: Public
Perceptions of the National Progress in Coping with Illegal Drugs
77
The Gallup Poll responses were elicted by the question "Now, how much progress do you feel
the nation has made over the last year or two in coping with the problem of illegal drugs-has it
made much progress, made some progress, stood still, lost some ground, or lost much ground?"
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76. Figures are from Gallup polling data available at Illegal Drugs, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll1657/
Illegal-drugs.aspx (last updated May 24, 2012).
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in 2011.78 The percentage of people believing some progress has been made was
actually slightly lower in 2011 than in 1972. 79 Significantly more people in
2011-31 percent-believe the nation has stood still rather than made progress
compared to 20 percent in 1972. The same proportion of respondents answered the
nation had lost some ground in coping with illegal drugs. The only slight
improvement is on the grimmest perception of whether the nation has lost much
ground-20 percent believed so in 1972 compared to 14 percent in 2011. While the
nation seemed more optimistic around the year 2000 about progress, the measures
are generally trending back to 1972 levels or slightly below. In light of all the costs
to buy a sense of scant progress or worse, it makes sense that drug war fatigue and
shrinking budgets are fueling a search for changes to drug offender processing as
usual.
B. Reimagining Traditional Criminal Justice Roles
The national coming-to-consciousness creates the opportunity to explore how
changes to traditional criminal justice actors' roles can further smarter approaches
to decarceration that also cut recidivism. Two of the most prevalent efforts to find
alternatives to incarceration-drug courts and pretrial diversion programs-have
relied on reconfiguring the discretion of two categories of criminal justice
professional elites: judges and prosecutors. 80 The role of the police in rehabilita-
tive efforts has been underutilized, however, despite the important position of
police at the threshold of the criminal justice system. This section contrasts the
influential reimagining of the traditional role of judges and prosecutors over the
decades in dealing with drug offenders with the relative neglect of the important
role police can play. The section argues that "street diversion"-what the article
dubs the prebooking diversion by police of drug offenders-can save in incarcera-
tion and court processing costs and reduce barriers to offender reintegration that
heighten the risk of recidivism.
1. Headway Involving Prosecutors and Judges
Drug courts are among the most promising decarceration innovations of the past
15 years. Reconfiguring the roles of judges, prosecutors and defense counsel to
better deal with drug offenses, the courts have garnered widespread bipartisan
support. 8 The idea of drug courts began as a small-scale, hyper-local innovation in
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See the discussion infra in the text at notes 88-109.
81. See, e.g., JAMES L. NOLAN, JR., REINVENTING JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN DRUG COURT MOVEMENT 5, 40, 191
(2001) (discussing widespread support for drug courts, albeit critiquing unintended consequences and the
reconfiguration of the roles of judge, prosecutor and defense attorney); Peggy Fulton Hora et al., Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System's Response
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Dade County, Florida, in hopes of coping with high narcotics caseloads in an
overburdened criminal justice system. 82 The innovation has spread-as of 2010,
more than 2,500 drug court programs are operating across the United States.83
Such treatment courts give offenders incentive to succeed in addiction treatment to
avoid prison and cast judges in the rehabilitative role, as providers of "tough love"
and cheerleaders toward success.84 Judges take a more active role in tracking and
urging progress while prosecutors and defense counsel occupy a less adversarial
and reduced role as part of a team working toward the subject's recovery.85
There is growing evidence of the success of the rehabilitative approach taken by
drug courts, measured in terms of recidivism reduction and cost savings.86 The
recently-concluded and largest evaluation of drug-court efficacy to date-
involving twenty-three drug courts across eight states-found that drug partici-
to Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439, 448-68 (1999) (heralding the import of drug
courts to breaking the cycle of reoffending and applying the insights of therapeutic jurisprudence); Claire
McCaskill, COMBATDrug Court: An Innovative Approach to Dealing With Drug Abusing First Time Offenders,
66 UMKC L. REV. 493, 498 (1998) (explaining success at reducing recidivism in a drug court program and the
central role of the judge); Dina Fine Maron, Courting Drug-Policy Reform: A Bipartisan Drug Policy 20 Years in
the Making?, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 6,2009, http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/10/06/courting-drug-policy-
reform.html (discussing bipartisan support for expanding drug courts, which helps reduce criminal justice
processing costs and address high recidivism of offenders); Reddy, supra note 71 (discussing the success of Texas
with treatment courts as an example for other jurisdictions).
82. See Judge Herbert Klein, Senior Judge, Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, The Power of Connection:
Fuel for Drug Courts, Keynote Address at the Florida Drug Court Conference 1-3 (1996) available at
http://wwwl.spa.american.edu/justice/documents/2195.pdf (explaining genesis of the approach by the judge
oft-credited for first launching it).
83. GOV'T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ADULT DRUG COURTS: STUDIES SHOW COURTS REDUCE RECIDIVISM, BUT
DOJ COULD ENHANCE FUTURE PERFORMANCE MEASURE REVISION EFFORTS 1-2 (2011); see also BUREAU OF
JUSTICE ADMIN. DRUG COURT CLEARINGHOUSE PROJECT, SUMMARY OF DRUG COURT ACTIVITY BY STATE AND
COUNTY 1-114 (2009) (collecting drug court information across the nation).
84. McCaskill, supra note 81, at 498 (explaining the import of the judge, who serves as the offender's
"cheerleader, chastiser and, ultimately, jailer, if necessary"); Dwight Vick & Jennifer Lamb Keating, Community-
Based Drug Courts: Empirical Success, 52 S.D. L. REV. 288, 291 (2007) (describing the cheerleading and
tough-love role of the judge).
85. Judith S. Kaye, Lawyering for a New Age, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1998); see also, e.g., Richard C.
Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Court Movement, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1205, 1249-60 (1998)
(expressing concern over defense attorneys acting as a "team player" in drug courts); Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team
Am I on Anyway? Musings of a Public DefenderAbout Drug Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 37, 38, 46-47, 50 (2000) (discussing dilemmas of a defense attorney in nonadversarial "team approach"
taken in drug court).
86. See, e.g., GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ADULT DRUG COURTS, supra note 83, at 19-20 (reporting
statistically significant reduction of the likelihood of recidivism for 18 out of 32 drug court programs reviewed
with re-arrest differences lower by 6 to 26% for program participants and 12 to 58% for program completers); Eric
L. Jensen & Clayton Mosher, Adult Drug Courts: Emergence, Growth, Outcome Evaluations, and the Need for a
Continuum of Care, 42 IDAHO L. REV. 443, 463 (2006) (finding evidence of recidivism reduction); Michael
Rempel, Dana-Fox Kralstein & Amanda Cissner, Drug Courts: An Effective Treatment Alternative, 19 CRIM. JUST.
34, 35 (2004) (finding evidence of success in lowering the likelihood of reoffending). But see Scott W. Henggeler
et. al., Juvenile Drug Court: Enhancing Outcomes by Incorporating Evidence-Based Treatment, 74 J. CONSULTING
& CLINICAL PSYCH. 42, 53 (2006) (finding the juvenile drug court programs studied did not reduce rearrest rates
despite reductions in antisocial behavior).
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pants had significantly lower rates of drug relapse and reoffending than compari-
son group members, committing more than 50 percent fewer criminal acts.87 On
cost savings, California, home to about 12 percent of the nation's drug courts,
calculated the state saved approximately $9 million a year using drug courts
because of the cheaper cost of diverting rather than jailing offenders and recidi-
vism reduction.88 To take an East Coast example, New Jersey's Supreme Court
praised the cost savings yielded by drug courts and found drug court rehabilitative
services-including six months of inpatient treatment-costs nearly half that of
housing a prison inmate for a year, at $17,266 compared to $34,218 per person.89
A qualification to the exuberance: many drug offenders, particularly narcotics
possession or use defendants, do not spend a whole year in jail.90 In general, the
most recent and largest-scale study of adult drug courts across the nation indicates
the operating costs of drug courts are more expensive than criminal processing as
usual-but return a net benefit of $2 for every $1 of cost, for a savings of between
$5,680 to $6,280 per participant because of crime prevention benefits. 9 ' Putting
judges in a rehabilitative role thus has measurable pay-offs for public safety,
human redemption, and perhaps lessens the strain on the public purse.
While treatment courts seem to be paying their way, one of the critiques is that
addiction continues to be funneled into the criminal justice system, with treatment
perversely conditioned on arrest, rather than addressed as a public health prob-
lem.92 The institutional actors central in treatment courts, judges, and prosecutors
enter the scene after the kick-start of the criminal process by arrest. Moreover,
while processes vary, the typical price of entry into treatment courts is the criminal
justice system's standard disposition of a guilty plea.93
2. Why Police Matter Too: Leveraging the Street-Level Gatekeeper's Role
Unlike judges, police stand at the gateway to criminal processing. They wield
87. SHELLI B. ROSSMAN ET AL., URBAN INST., THE MULTI-SITE ADULT DRUG CoURr EVALUATION: THE IMPACT OF
DRUG COURTS 66, 70, 257-58 (2011).
88. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS (CAL.), CALIFORNIA DRUG COURT COST ANALYSIS STUDY 1-2, 4 (2006).
89. State v. Meyer, 930 A.2d 428,433 (N.J. 2007).
90. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2010 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 73, at tbl.13 (listing mean and median
federal drug possession sentence as around 3 months).
91. ROSSMAN ET AL., supra note 87, at 258. Note, the finding is not statistically significant, however, mainly
because of the wide variation in outcomes. Id. at 247, 258.
92. See, e.g., NAT'L ASSOC'N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, AMERICA'S PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS: THE
CRIMINAL COSTS OF TREATMENT AND THE CASE FOR REFORM 10 (2009):
Addiction is an illness. Illnesses should be treated through the public health system- not punished
through the criminal justice system. Conditioning treatment on an arrest and entry in the criminal
justice system sends a perverse message to the person who is ill and is an enormous waste of scarce
public and court resources.
One of the most vocal authors of the critique, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, argues for
drug decriminalization. Id. at 20. This article takes no position on the longstanding and fiercely-split debate.
93. See, e.g., NOLAN, JR., supra note 81, at 40-41 (describing typical process).
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the decision over whether to arrest and therefore represent the earliest juncture for
pre-booking diversion into rehabilitation. Giving police the power to divert would
avoid the problem and perverse incentive, raised by critics of drug courts, of police
arresting minor offenders to get them into treatment.94 The potential of using
police as adjuncts in rehabilitative efforts, however, is relatively underutifized in
America.
To date, American diversion programs, like treatment courts, have largely relied
on the decision-making of non-police actors further down the criminal processing
timeline-especially prosecutors.95 The basic idea behind diversion programs is
that defendants who meet eligibility requirements and whose crimes relate to an
underlying problem such as addiction undergo supervision and treatment rather
than trial and incarceration.96 Like drug courts, diversion programs typically kick
in after the launch of criminal processing by arrest.97
Since the 1967 President's Crime Commission influentially recommended
diversion, pretrial diversion programs have spread throughout the nation, with
about 298 pretrial diversion programs spread over 45 states, the District of
Columbia and the Virgin Islands today.98 Like drug courts, pretrial diversion
became popular in the 1970s as a way to cut costs and reduce prison rolls, as well
as to rehabilitate offenders. 99 While the original ideal type of pretrial diversion
culminated in dismissal of charges on satisfaction of diversion conditions, in
recent years, many "diversion" programs are actually much more tightly inter-
twined with criminal processing, requiring guilty pleas before entry into the
program.' The explosion of such programs has led to an expansion of the ideal
type to include reduction of a sentence or charge rather than dismissal of
94. See, e.g., Morris B. Hoffman, The Rehabilitative Ideal and the Drug Court Reality, 14 FED. SENT'G REP.
172, 174 (2002) (contending "the very presence of drug courts is causing police to make arrests in, and
prosecutors to file, the kinds of ten- and twenty-dollar hand-to-hand drug cases that the system would not have
bothered with before").
95. See, e.g., U.S. ATrORNEY'S MANUAL, § 9.22.100 (2012) (stating diversion may occur in the discretion of
the U.S. Attorney); JOHN CLARK, PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., THE ROLE OF TRADITIONAL PRETRIAL DIVERSION IN THE
AGE OF SPECIALTY TREATMENT COURTs: EXPANDING THE RANGE OF PROBLEM-SOLVING OPTIONS AT THE PRETRIAL
STAGE 9 (2007) (explaining the prosecutor is the gatekeeper in diversion programs); Debra T. Landis, Pretrial
Diversion: Statute or Court Rule Authorizing Suspension or Dismissal of Criminal Prosecution on Defendant's
Consent to NoncriminalAlternative, 4 A.L.R. 147, at § 2[b] (1981) (detailing process and noting wide discretion
of prosecutors, sometimes based on recommendation of administrators such as program directors and coordinators).
96. CLARK, supra note 95, at 4; Hung-En Sung, From Diversion to Reentry: Recidivism Risks Among
Graduates ofAn Alternative to Incarceration Program, 22 CRIM. JUST. PoL'Y REV. 219, 220 (2011).
97. CLARK, supra note 95, at 6-13 (noting parallels between drug court and diversion programs).
98. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A
FREE SOCIETY 133-34 (1967) (recommending pretrial diversion); NAT'L ASS'N OF PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCIES,
PROMISING PRACTICES IN PRETRIAL DIVERSION 4-5, 9 (2009) [hereinafter PROMISING PRACTICES] (discussing
definitions and prevalence).
99. See, e.g., MALCOLM FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRIAL: WHY SIMPLE SOLUTIONS FAIL 103-05 (1983) (giving
history of diversion programs).
100. CLARK, supra note 95, at 4-5 (noting shift).
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charges-a model much more allied with criminal processing.'l° Prosecutors are
the central gatekeepers, wielding broad discretion over whether defendants get
pretrial diversion, weighing factors such as the nature of the offense, the interest in
saving prosecutorial and judicial resources, and crime prevention.10 2
While treatment courts and pretrial diversion programs have influentially
reimagined the role of judges and prosecutors, the threshold gatekeepers of the
criminal justice system, police, have largely been left out of the rehabilitative
reorientation. We can go further, earlier and deeper in realizing the benefits of
asking traditional criminal justice professionals to take on rehabilitative responsi-
bilities. Police are important institutional actors wielding power over whether to
arrest-a crucial juncture for rehabilitative intervention and lessening the load on
courts and the criminal justice system.
Waiting until after arrest to sort people for potential diversion or drug court
treatment carries added costs for the public fisc and for the offender. In terms of
costs to the public, intensive court monitoring and judicial participation is one of
the major reasons why drug courts are more expensive than criminal processing as
usual.' 3 Cutting courts out saves money-as does avoiding the need for prosecu-
tors and defense attorneys necessitated by the launch of the criminal process. °4
Moreover, street-level diversion can cut the jail crowding produced by pretrial
detention in a system where many offenders cannot afford to make bail and crowd
local jails awaiting court processing. 105
In terms of cost reduction from the offender's perspective, even if charges are
ultimately dismissed, arrests remain on an individual's criminal history records,
101. NAT'L ASS'N OF PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCIES, PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND GOALS FOR PRETRIAL
DIVERSION/INTERVErION 1-2 (2008).
102. See, e.g., U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL, supra note 95, at § 9.22.010 (stating diversion occurs before
charging in the majority of cases and is based on weighing of factors such as conserving prosecutorial and judicial
resources and crime prevention); CLARK, supra note 95, at 9-10 (explaining central gatekeeping role of
prosecutors).
103. See ROSSMAN ETAL., supra note 87, at 258.
104. Cf Sheryl Pimlott Kubiak et al., Treatment at the Front End of the Criminal Justice Continuum: The
Association Between Arrest and Admission into Specialty Substantive Abuse Treatment, 1 SUBSTANCE ABUSE
TREATMENT, PREVENTION & POLY 20, 28 (2006) (arguing that using arrest as a catalyst for treatment would be a
wiser and more cost-effective way to keep individuals out of confinement and court processing, multiple arrests,
and incarceration cost far more than treatment).
105. See, e.g., JUSTICE POLICY INST., BALTIMORE BEHIND BARS: How TO REDUCE THE JAIL POPULATION, SAVE
MONEY, AND IMPROVE PUBLIC SAFETY 13 (2010) (discussing how pretrial detention exacerbates prison overcrowd-
ing); Marcia Johnson & Luckett Anthony Johnson, Bail: Reforming Policies to Address Overcrowded Jails, the
Impact of Race on Detention, and Community Revival in Harris County, Texas, 7 Nw. J. L. & SOC. POL'Y 42,
47-48 (2012) (discussing how constrictions on pretrial release has exacerbated prison overcrowding); Lise Olsen,
Thousands languish in crowded Harris County Jail, HOUSTON CHRON. (Aug. 22, 2009), available at http://
www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Thousands-languish-in-crowded-Harris-County-Jail- 1 722047.php
(discussing how thousands of people-most commonly minor drug offenders-are packed into jail awaiting court
processing).
[Vol. 50:165
STREET DIVERSION AND DECARCERATION
which can be publicly accessible. 106 Even without conviction, arrests carry heavy
collateral consequences that impede successful societal reintegration, for example
constituting a basis for denial of employment, housing assistance, and educational
opportunities.10 7 Except in "ban the box" jurisdictions such as Connecticut and
Massachusetts, employers often use arrest history as a screen-out basis for job
applicants.' 0 8 The reduction in barriers to societal reintegration for offenders can
translate into public safety benefits for society by lowering the pressures that
enhance the risk of recidivism. Because police wield the discretion to determine
whether or not to arrest, they can powerfully leverage their vantage at the gateway
and on the streets to direct people into rehabilitation rather than criminal process-
ing with its manifold human, systemic, and societal costs.
II. A PRACTICABLE MODEL OF EVERYDAY REHABILITATIVE POLICING
The notion of police exercising discretion to help manage public health con-
cerns and divert away from arrest is not altogether foreign to U.S. criminal justice.
The mass deinstitutionalization of mental health hospitals that sent hundreds of
thousands inmates out between 1955 and 1980 forced police into managing people
with mental illness.' 0 9 Many of the mentally ill were re-institutionalized-in
jail-then released to reoffend and restart the cycle of incarceration without
addressing the root mental illness driving recidivism." 0 For police and communi-
ties, the revolving door of arresting, incarcerating, and releasing the mentally
ill-often repeatedly arrested for low-level offenses linked to mental illness such
as trespassing, loitering, and disorderly conduct-has been immensely frustrat-
106. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6254(0 (West 2012) (providing that arrest records are public information);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 13.82 (West 2012) (providing that arrest data is public information); Mary De Ming Fan,
Reforming the Criminal Rap Sheet: Federal Timidity and the Traditional State Functions Doctrine, 33 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 31, 54-58 (2005) (explaining rap sheets and their use).
107. K. Babe Howell, From Page to Practice and Back Again: Broken Windows Policing and the Real Costs to
Law-Abiding New Yorkers of Color, 34 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 439, 443 (2010) (describing the potential
costs of arrest).
108. See, e.g., Michelle Natividad Rodriguez & Maurice Emsellem, 65 Million Need Not Apply: The Case for
Reforming Criminal Background Checks for Employment, NAT'L EMP'T LAW PROJECT, March 2011, at 4-5,
available at http://www.facesandvoicesofrecovery.org/pdf/eNews/65-Million-Need-NotApply.pdf. (discussing
widespread employer screens using arrest and/or conviction information).
109. See, e.g., MELISSA REULAND, A GUIDE TO IMPLEMENTING POLICE-BASED DIVERSION PROGRAMS FOR PEOPLE
WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 1-2 (Substance Abuse & Mental Health Services Admin. 2004) (giving history of mental
illness deinstitutionalization). For histories of deinstitutionalization in the United States, see, for example, E.
FULLER, TORREY, NOWHERE TO Go: THE TRAGIC ODYSSEY OF THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL 4-12 (1984); Bernard
E. Harcourt, Reducing Mass Incarceration: Lessons from the Deinstitutionalization of Mental Hospitals in the
1960s, at 2, 5-11 (John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 542, 2011).
110. See, e.g., RISDON N. SLATE & W. WESLEY JOHNSON, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF MENTAL ILLNESS: CRISIS &
OPPORTUNITY FOR THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 59-60 (2008) (arguing the criminal justice system has become a substitute
for closed mental institutions); M.J. Stephey, De-Criminalizing Mental Illness, TIME, Aug. 8, 2007 (describing
cycle of reoffending among the incarcerated mentally ill and the growing desire in jurisdictions to find a better
way).
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ing.l 1 Searching for a more cost-effective way to deal with the needs of the
mentally ill, police in some jurisdictions have innovated and interfaced with public
health providers to take people to treatment rather than jail. 1 2 Three major models
of police-based diversion have emerged that can be adapted to wider use in dealing
with drug offenders.
A. Insights from Mental Health Diversion for A Police-Sorting Model
Among jurisdictions that have taken a public health management rather than
arrest approach to dealing with the mentally ill, three primary models have
emerged that can be classified based on the nature of police involvement:
(1) Using Trained Police Officers As Responders;
(2) Using Police-Mental Health Provider Partnerships As Responders;
(3) Using Mental Health Providers Offering Direct Care. 13
These mental health pre-booking diversion models vary in terms of who wields
the discretion to decide whether to send someone to mental health treatment rather
jail. Some programs deploy personnel trained in behavioral health or social work
to steer diversion discretion while others entrust police officers to make the
judgment call after training in mental health issues.' 14 Which model has proved the
most popular has changed over time in a manner that offers insights about what is
most sustainable-a crucial factor beyond what is merely ideal for practicability in
the real world. A 1996 survey of seventy-eight departments with specialized
programs for the mentally ill indicated that the use of mental health providers was
the most prevalent approach."15 By 2003, however, the most common approach
was a trained police response, sometimes supplemented with a police-mental
health provider partnership. 116 The shift to primarily police responders is not
surprising. Having specialized mental health providers in mobile crisis units is
expensive. In tight times, criminal law enforcers are less likely to be a casualty of
budget cuts as mental health providers." 
7
One of the earliest and most influential approaches to police-based diversion is
an example of the first form, using trained police responders. After Memphis
police shot a schizophrenic man," 18 the city started the Crisis Intervention Team
11l. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, JAIL DIVERSION: STRATEGIES FOR PERSONS WITH SERIOUS
MENTAL ILLNESS 4-5 (2006).
112. See REULAND, supra note 109, at 3-4.
113. MELISSA REULAND & JASON CHENEY, ENHANCING SUCCESS OF POLICE-BASED DIVERSION PROGRAMS FOR
PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 2-3 (Police Executive Research Forum May 2005).
114. Kathleen Hartford, Robert Carey & James Mendonca, Pre-Arrest Diversion of People with Mental
Illness: Literature Review and International Survey, 23 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 845, 852 (2006).
115. REULAND & CHENEY supra note 113, at 2-3.
116. Id.
117. ld. at 11-12.
118. M.J. Stephey, De-Criminalizing the Mentally Ill, TIME, Aug. 8, 2007.
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(CIT), a pre-booking diversion program that puts discretion to divert in the hands
of officers with 40 hours of training on psychiatric disorders, substance abuse
issues, and relevant laws." 9 Officers have the power to refer or transport the
mentally ill to emergency services providers, which have a no-refusal policy in
cases referred by police. 2° The Memphis crisis intervention model has been
adopted in hundreds of U.S. jurisdictions.' 21 The nascent foray into prebooking
diversion for narcotics offenders discussed at the article's outset, the LEAD
program also adopts the model of police officers as sorter. 
1 22
The second most popular form involves partnerships between police and mental
health providers. 123 For example, in responding to calls involving persons with
mental illness, San Diego police deploy Psychiatric Emergency Response Teams
(PERT) composed of police officers and county-employed mental health profes-
sionals.1 24 The officers receive eighty hours of training on how to assess persons
with mental illness and finding treatment resources. 125 To take another example, in
Santa Fe, New Mexico, officers consult with behavioral health experts to deter-
mine how to handle mentally ill offenders. 126 For safety reasons, the police-mental
health provider partnership model is preferable to the third and less prevalent
model of mental health teams working independently of police because of the
dangers of encountering potentially violent individuals. 1
27
Because of the relatively new nature of prebooking diversion programs, there
are few systematic empirical studies of efficacy to date. 128 The early findings,
however, are encouraging. A study of three specialized police programs for
handling mental illness found relatively low arrest rates when trained teams were
deployed.129 A study of six diversion programs for the mentally ill, including three
prebooking programs, found the diversion reduced time spent in jail and increased
time lived in the community without increasing public safety risk. 130 The finding
119. Hartford, Carey & Mendonca, supra note 114, at 850.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See LEAD Protocol, supra note 1, at 1 ("[Tlhe primary decision maker initially will be Seattle Police
Department officers on the street, pursuant to clear criteria on which officers have been trained by command
staff.").
123. REULAND & CHENEY, supra note 113, at 2-3.
124. Hartford, Carey & Mendonca, supra note 114, at 850.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. H. Richard Lamb et al., Outcome for Psychiatric Emergency Patients Seen by an Outreach Police-Mental
Health Team, in DEINSTrrT'iONALIZATION: PROMISE AND PROBLEMS 73-74 (Richard H. Lamb & Linda E.
Weinberger, eds. 2001).
128. Hartford, Carey & Mendonca, supra note 114, at 849; Henry J. Steadman & Michelle Naples, Assessing
the Effectiveness of Jail Diversion Programs for Persons with Serious Mental Illness and Co-Occurring
Substance Use Disorders, 23 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 163, 164-65 (2005).
129. Henry J. Steadman et al., Comparing Outcomes of Major Models of Police Responses to Mental Health
Emergencies, 51 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 645, 648 (2000).
130. Steadman & Naples, supra note 128, at 168.
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that diversion was achieved without increasing risk to public safety is particularly
striking in light of study findings that patients taken by police to psychiatric
emergency rooms tend to be more dangerous and more psychiatrically dis-
turbed. 1
31
Overall, diversion programs appear to lower criminal justice costs but carry
increased treatment costs, which in the short-term may seem like a higher overall
cost. 132 But this does not quantify long-term savings from improving mental
health. One study found the Memphis program, which has become a model for so
many others, resulted in improved Colorado Symptom Inventory mental health
scores, at a cost of $1,236 per point of improvement. 133 Moreover, Memphis crisis
intervention officers have reported positive impressions, including increased
confidence in dealing with the mentally ill, lower officer injury rates, and a very
low arrest rate of two percent for the mentally ill because of diversion to mental
health services. 134 A study found the Memphis team was the most active among
three models studied in treatment referrals in addition to having the lowest arrest
rate-75 percent of mental disturbance calls resulted in treatment. 
135
The most practicable model for a broadening rehabilitative policing to include
narcotics offenders is the most prevalent approach for dealing with the mentally
ill-the Memphis crisis intervention model. While mental health professionals
working alongside police officers may seem desirable, it is hard to implement in
everyday policing. It is one thing to deploy a team of specially trained police and
county mental health professionals on select calls where there is reason to believe a
mentally ill person is in need of crisis intervention, as San Diego does. 136 It is not
practicable to fund a huge cadre of special behavioral health professionals to
address drug offenders, a main staple of everyday policing on the street. In 2009,
alone, police arrested more than 1.6 million drug offenders.137 An estimated 40
percent of arrestees-a group numbering 13.689 million people in 2009138-have
drug dependency issues. 139 Research has indicated crisis intervention teams are
profoundly overstretched even in simply responding to mental health calls.140 If
police diversion is to be a regular practice rather than a rarity in dealing with the
vast sea of narcotics offenders, then the most practicable approach is to train police
in sorting rather than fantasizing about funding a huge force of mental health
131. Lamb et al., supra note 127, at 68.
132. Steadman & Naples, supra note 128, at 168.
133. Id.
134. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 111, at 12-13; Steadman et al., supra note 129,
at 648.
135. Steadman et al., supra note 129, at 648.
136. See discussion in the text supra, at notes 123-25.
137. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ARREST IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980-2009, at 2 tbl. 1 (Sept. 2011).
138. Id.
139. Kubiak et al., supra note 104, at 21-22.
140. REULAND & CHENEY, supra note 113, at 12; Steadman et al., supra note 129, at 646-47.
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providers to do so alongside police.1 4 1
B. The Virtues and Dilemmas of Police Discretion in Therapeutic Sorting
Empirical work on the police force abounds with portrayals of officers as
authoritarian, adversarial, suspicious, and status quo-oriented, with an "us-versus-
them" orientation toward the community. 142 This portrait hardly inspires hope that
police will blithely wear the warm and fuzzy hat of rehabilitation. Yet police
officers do much more than ordinary criminal law enforcement-indeed 70
percent to 80 percent of an officer's time is spent on community assistance rather
than criminal law enforcement. 143 Adding therapeutic discretion to the broad and
low-visibility discretion that police already hold to arrest or to release people has
practical virtues-but may also rouse fears. The following section discusses major
virtues and potential concerns.
1. Virtues: Cost Savings, Buy-In Cultivation, Role Internalization
The first major benefit of relying on police to take on the front-line rehabilitative
sorting role is that it is cheaper, and thus more likely to become a regular practice
than an irregular exception. Police are on the streets anyway. The main costs for
casting police in a rehabilitative diversion sorting role thus mainly stem from
training and monitoring. Extrapolating from the length of training programs in
police-based mental health diversion programs, training likely will range from a
week (40 hours) to two weeks (80 hours). 44 In contrast, deployment of mental
health professionals will deter the takeoff of street diversion programs in two
ways: (1) in a time of acute budgetary strain, states are unlikely to supplement
police forces with a phalanx of public health professionals, and (2) if police need to
consult with a public health professional to determine diversion eligibility, this will
141. See, e.g., REULAND & CHENEY, supra note 113, at 11-12 (discussing the challenges of dealing with the
costs of diversion personnel).
142. See, e.g., JEROME H. SCOLNICK & JAMES F FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE USE OF
FORCE 25-33, 90-94 (1993) (discussing officers' subculture of mistrust, violence, and sense that they hold the line
between order and chaos); WESLEY G. SKOGAN ET AL., ON THE BEAT. POLICE AND COMMUNITY PROBLEM SOLVING
29 (1999) (reporting findings that many Chicago officers had a negative view of the community they policed and
viewed the public-and the police organization-as hostile to their interests); WESLEY G. SKOGAN & SUSAN M.
HARTNETT, COMMUNITY POLICING, CHICAGO STYLE 79 (1997) (presenting interview findings that police officers
believed the public lacked understanding about their needs); RONALD WETER & STEVEN A. TUCH, RACE AND
POLICING IN AMERICA: CONFLICT AND REFORM 4-5 (2006) (collecting studies); Christine Gardiner, "An Absolute
Revolving Door": An Evaluation of Police Perception and Response to Proposition 36. 20 CR1M. JUST. POL'Y REV.
1, 3-4 (2011) (collecting studies).
143. See, e.g., SAMUEL WALKER & CHARLES M. KATZ, THE POLICE IN AMERICA: AN INTRODUCTION 5 (2005)
(reporting criminal law enforcement constitutes only about one-third of a patrol officer's daily work); Michael R.
Dimino, Sr., Police Paternalism: Community Caretaking, Assistance Searches, and Fourth Amendment Reason-
ableness, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1485, 1486 & n.3 (2009) (collecting estimates).
144. See Hartford, Carey & Mendonca, supra note 114, at 850 (listing Memphis training as entailing 40 hours
and San Diego training as entailing 80 hours).
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increase response and encounter times, deterring officers from considering diver-
sion to avoid the consultation. 1
4 5
A second more subtle virtue of conferring discretion and training on police is the
cultivation of police buy-in, which is critical to prevent subversion of rehabilitative
goals. The literature is filled with cautionary tales about the need to secure police
buy-in. Police occupy low-visibility high-power roles that determine whether
reforms on the books get translated into reality.146 Studies have found when police
are resistant to changes in law and legal paradigms, they can subvert the reforms or
change them in implementation away from the original ideas.1 47 Consider, for
example, the implementation of California's Proposition 36, which attempted to
shift the criminal justice system's response to drug offenders by mandating
treatment rather than incarceration for certain drug offenses.' 48 Recent research
found officers opposing the reform disqualified offenders from diversion by
tacking on non-narcotics charges in arrests for otherwise diversion-mandatory
narcotics offenses. 1
49
The lesson is that even when law enforcement discretion seems formally
removed it is still powerfully in play. The wiser course is to cultivate police buy-in.
Now is an opportune time to get police buy-in because police departments are
increasingly sensitive to the need for a makeover and improving community
relations.15 0 In a networked and cell phone camera age, police are under an
145. See, e.g., REULAND & CHENEY, supra note 113, at 11-12 (explaining legislatures are more likely to fund
law enforcement than mental health professionals); Steadman et al., supra note 129, at 648-49 (noting longer
response times because of the scarcity of specially trained teams).
146. See, e.g., Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility
Decisions in the Administration of Criminal Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 552-80 (1960) (discussing concerns over
low visibility and broad police discretion not to fully enforce the criminal laws).
147. See, e.g., Christine Gardiner, "An Absolute Revolving Door": An Evaluation of Police Perception and
Response to Proposition 36, 23 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REv. 277, 283-94 (2011) (collecting studies on subversion of
law and policy reforms such as community policing and hot-spot policing and presenting data on police
subversion of reforms wrought by California's Proposition 36); see also, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies,
Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 496
(2000) (finding that in practice, police implementation of broken windows theory in New York departed from the
idea's nuanced rationale of focusing on indicia of physical disorder and instead relied on race and socioeconomic
status as markers of disorder).
148. See SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND CRIME PREVENTION ACT OF 2000, 2000 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 36 § 3 (West)
(passed Nov. 7, 2000) (eff. July 1,2001):
The People of the State of California hereby declare their purpose and intent ... : (a) To divert
from incarceration into community-based substance abuse treatment programs nonviolent defen-
dants, probationers and parolees charged with simple drug possession or drug use offenses; (b) To
halt the wasteful expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars each year on the incarceration-
and reincarceration-of nonviolent drug users who would be better served by community-based
treatment ....
149. Gardiner, supra note 147, at 287-90.
150. See, e.g., STEVEN L. FRAZIER, THE LOSS OF PUBLIC TRUST IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 3-4 (Command College
Class 40, May 2007) (discussing concerns with deteriorating law enforcement reputation in community
perceptions); Catherine Gallagher et al., The Public Image of Police at ch.2, § VIII, International Ass'n of Chiefs
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increasingly Panoptic' 5 ' public eye and acutely aware that mistrust can go viral,
amplified online to create cascades of mistrust and tighter scrutiny. 152 Moreover, if
community relations become inflamed, investigation is a more credible threat
since the advent of 42 U.S.C. § 14141, which authorizes the Justice Department to
investigate police based on reasonable cause to believe the department has
engaged in a pattern or practice of violating civil rights.153 Indeed, it is paradoxical-
but also understandable-that the innovative LEAD police diversion program
discussed at the article's outset arose from the Seattle police, a department under
Justice Department investigation for excessive force after several incidents caught
on videotape.1 54 The program arose in close collaboration with community
organizations, including police adversaries such as the public defender association,
in an effort to rebuild community confidence. 1
55
A third virtue is role expansion and internalization of a rehabilitative role in new
generations of an increasingly professionalized police force. Conferring therapeu-
tic discretion-coupled with expert training-can be palatably pitched as develop-
ing what Justice Scalia has called the "increasing professionalism of police
forces."'156 To appeal to the status quo orientation of people attracted to policing,
the role expansion can be tied to deepening and developing the traditional
community caretaking role of Officer Friendly on the comer who got to know
people and wisely wielded discretion when they stumbled. 157 Changing the law
of Police Global Leadership in Policing, (Oct. 2, 2001) (noting that though public opinion polls show generally
high levels of satisfaction with police, the "image of police appears to have been declining since the mid-to-late
1960s" and police should be wary of disappointing the high expectations Americans have for police because of the
dangers of dissatisfied groups organizing); see also, e.g., TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. Huo, TRUST IN THE LAW:
ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH POLICE AND THE COURTS 175-82 (2002) (collecting studies and
presenting data based on surveys of people in Oakland and Los Angeles).
151. The idea of the Panopticon famously originated by Jeremy Bentham is that subjects in a state of perfect
transparency arrayed around a watchtower will self-police because they internalize the external gaze. Miran
Bolovi , Introduction to JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PANOPTICON WRITINGS 13-17 (Miran Bolovi6 ed., 1995).
Originally Bentham's plan for a smarter prison, the idea of the Panopticon has become a metaphor for modem
surveillance society. See, e.g., THEORIZING SURVEILLANCE: THE PANOPTICON AND BEYOND 4-8, 14-17 (David Lyon
ed., 2006) (extending metaphor to management of modem society); MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH:
THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 200-01 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977) (extending Panopticon metaphor to one of
management of modem society). Controversy over police practices have led to structural reforms that put police
under the Panoptic gaze. Mary D. Fan, Panopticism for Police: Structural Reform Bargaining and Police
Regulation by Data-Driven Surveillance, 87 WASH. L. REV. 93, 102, 130-131 (2012).
152. See, e.g., FRAZIER, supra note 150, at 4 (discussing online circulation of critiques and complaints).
153. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 210401, 108 Stat.
1796, 2071 (1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14141(b) (2006)).
154. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGIrrS Div., & U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, V. DIST. OF WASH., INVESTIGArION
OF THE SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT 26 (Dec. 16, 2011); Mike Carter, Justice Department to Investigate Seattle
Police Civil Rights Practices, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 31, 2011, at A 1.
155. For background see LEAD Plan, supra note 2, at 2.
156. Hudson v. Mich., 547 U.S. 586, 598 (2006).
157. See, e.g., Robert C. Trojanowicz & Bonnie Bucqueroux, Police and Community as Partners, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, June 8, 1992, at I (hearkening back to "the old-fashioned beat cop.., who acts as a neighborhood
organizer and problem-solver, not just as a visible deterrent to crime").
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and legal paradigm on the books is not enough to secure change on the streets
without an interest convergence with those wielding power on the streets-the
police. 158 Real change in role orientation is better achieved when couched in terms
of police interests in enhancing community relations, improving professional
status, and deepening a traditional role of acting in the community's best interests.
2. Concerns: Therapeutic Discretion, Checks, Information Deficits
The three central concerns of giving police therapeutic discretion boil down to
discretion, discretion, and discretion-albeit different aspects of concerns roused
when police rather than prosecutors and judges wield therapeutic discretion.
Constitutional criminal procedure, the main body of law regulating the police,
entrusts officers with more power when engaged in community caretaking such as
rescuing the injured or serving other special needs or administrative purposes. 159
The relaxation of regulation suggests that when officers are not engaged in the
"competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime"-an oft-recurring image in the case
law 6 0 -we need not be as worried about an excess of zeal and related dangers. 161
Nonetheless, there is a long scholarly tradition of distrust in police as an
institutional actor, particularly in decisions on the street about whether to arrest or
exercise leniency.' 62 Scholars have expressed concern over the lack of guidelines
standardizing police discretion, the propriety of police making complex policy
judgments, and the opacity of police decision-making, which can mask inequities
158. Cf Bell, Jr., supra note 67, at 523 (interest-convergence theory); Gardiner, supra note 147, at 3-4 (on
police subversion if change is imposed without internalization and agreement).
159. See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398,406 (2006) (holding police may make a warrantless entry
into a home if there is an objectively reasonable basis to believe there is an injured person inside needing help
because "[t]he role of a peace officer includes preventing violence and restoring order, not simply rendering first
aid to casualties"); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 381 (1987) (explaining inventory searches are exempt from
the Fourth Amendment's default warrant requirement "because they are conducted by the government as part of a
'community caretaking' function"); see also, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080-81 (2011) (noting
special needs and administrative searches are two exceptions to the general Fourth Amendment rule that law
enforcement motives do not matter); Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (giving authorities
greater latitude in schoolhouse searches that serve "special needs beyond the normal need for law enforcement");
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987) (applying general reasonableness requirement for administrative
searches of closely regulated businesses).
160. E.g., Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 15 (1995); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 351 (1987); Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
161. Cf David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1734 (2005) (noting wryly
that the imagery of police engaged in the "competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime" recurs so often that one
wonders if it is "a diplomatic way to address worries beyond an excess of zeal").
162. See, e.g., DAvIs, supra note 23, at 38-40, 52, 139, 144 (1975) (expressing concern over low-level
patrolman defacto forging varying enforcement policies through decisions whether or not to enforce the law);
id., at 83 (expressing concern over unconstrained police policy judgments in decisions not to enforce); WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, ARREST:. THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 75-82 (Frank J. Remington ed. 1965)
(expressing concern over lack of guidelines for police discretion); SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE
CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1950-1990 21, 39-41 (Oxford University Press ed. 1993)
(describing the problem of low-level opacity in police discretion).
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in the exercise of judgment. 163
Street diversion programs implemented by police have an important advantage
over traditional police decisions on whether or not to fully enforce the law-
explicit guidelines. Two key characteristics of diversion programs distinguish
them from traditional discretionary decisions about whether to arrest or prosecute.
First are uniform eligibility criteria to select candidates for structured services
delivery and supervision. Second are the benefits of case dismissal or mitigation
upon successful completion.64 For example, the LEAD Protocol specifies adults
sugpected of violations of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act or prostitution
are eligible for prebooking diversion and presumptively should be referred except
if:
* The amount of drugs involved exceeds 3 grams (except where an individual
has been arrested for delivery of or possession with intent to deliver
marijuana, or .... prescription controlled substances (pills)...);
" The individual does not appear amenable to diversion;
" The suspected drug activity involves delivery or possession with intent to
deliver (PWI), and there is reason to believe the suspect is dealing for profit
above a subsistence income;
" The individual appears to exploit minors or others in a drug dealing
enterprise;
" The individual is suspected of promoting prostitution; and/or
* The individual has disqualifying criminal history as follows:
Without time limitation: Any conviction for murder 1 or 2, arson 1 or 2,
Robbery 1, Assault 1, kidnapping, VUFA [violation of the Uniform Fire-
arms Act] 1, or any sex offense (or attempt of any crime listed here).
Within the past 10 years: Any conviction for a domestic violence offense,
Robbery 2, Assault 2 or 3, Burglary 1 or 2, or VUFA 2.165
The prescribing of guidelines to steer police judgment responds to the concerns
expressed by scholars such as Kenneth Culp Davis and Wayne LaFave regarding
amorphous discretion and defacto police policy-making. 166 Community stakehold-
ers have made the policy judgments as. to who should qualify for prebooking
diversion in prescribing the guidelines.
163. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 23, at 83 (expressing concern that police are entrusted with enforcement
discretion that commits "to personnel with average education of 12.4 years" policy judgments that "call for the
best talents and specializations that the society can muster"); LAFAVE, supra note 162, at 75-82, 162-63 (lack of
guidelines and potential inequities); WALKER. supra note 162, at 21, 39-41 (expressing concern over opacity and
inequity); RONALD WEITZER & STEVEN A. TUCH, Race and Policing in America: Conflict and Reform 96-110
(Cambridge University Press ed. 2006) (discussing minority perceptions of inequities in police exercises of
discretion).
164. PROMISING PRACTICES, supra note 98, at 5.
165. LEAD Protocol, supra note 1, at 3.
166. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 23, at 83 (expressing concern over police policy judgments); LAFAVE, supra
note 162, at 75-82, 162-63 (expressing concern regarding lack of guidelines).
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No police officer is an automaton or computer, however, and the guidelines are
not a precise programming code. For example, the criterion of whether an
individual appears amenable to diversion calls for the officer on the street to
exercise a form of therapeutic judgment. Herein lays a major dilemma of
discretion. On the one hand, even the most prominent proponents of cabining
police discretion, such as Kenneth Culp Davis, acknowledge the crucial need for
police discretion: "Police discretion is absolutely essential. It cannot be elimi-
nated .... Police work without discretion would be something like a torso without
legs, arms, or head."1 67 Police discretion gives the law eyes to see and a brain to
perceive the reality on the ground.
But human judgment also has blind spots in empathy and compassion for
individuals of other racial groups.168 A rich body of literature has documented how
implicit biases-negative perceptions of minorities that may unconsciously lurk
despite best intentions-impact the judgment of an array of actors, such as police,
prosecutors, and jurors. 169 Implicit bias is not just a problem in everyday criminal
justice-an increasingly vast body of medical literature has found implicit biases
may impact the therapeutic discretion of physicians as well. 170 There is a
substantial body of findings that doctors exercise therapeutic discretion differently
167. DAVIS, supra note 23, at 140.
168. See, e.g., Jennifer N. Gutsell & Michael Inzlicht, Intergroup Differences in the Sharing of Emotive States:
Neural Evidence ofAn Empathy Gap, SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCI. ADVANCE ACCESS, June 23, 2011,
at 1-2, 5-6 (collecting studies and more evidence finding reduced empathetic capacity for individuals of other
racial groups).
169. E.g., Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 UCLA
L. Rev. 1241; Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer's Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate Potentially
Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314 (2002); Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Targets
of Discrimination: Effects of Race on Responses to Weapons Holders, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 399
(2003); Scott W. Howe, The Futile Quest for Racial Neutrality in Capital Selection and the Eighth Amendment
Argument for Abolition Based on Unconscious Racial Discrimination, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2083 (2004);
Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1016 (1988); Jerry Kang,
Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (2005); Cynthia Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, 42 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 471 (2008); Rory K. Little, What Federal Prosecutors Really Think: The Puzzle of Statistical Race Disparity
Versus Specific Guilt, and the Specter of Timothy McVeigh, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1591 (2004); Jeffrey J. Pokorak,
Probing the Capital Prosecutor's Perspective: Race of the Discretionary Actors, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1811 (1998);
L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035 (2011); Yoav Sapir,
Neither Intent nor Impact: A Critique of the Racially Based Selective Prosecution Jurisprudence and a Reform
Proposal, 19 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 127 (2003).
170. See, e.g., John F. Dovidio et al., Disparities and Distrust: The Implication of Psychological Processes for
Understanding Racial Disparities in Health and Healthcare, 67 SOC. SCI. & MED. 478, 480-87 (2008) (collecting
studies and findings on the impact of implicit biases on disparities in care and treatment decisions for minorities);
Alexander R. Green et al., supra note 25, at 1237 (detecting implicit bias in doctors' decisions regarding whether
to prescribe thrombolysis for patients); Michael S. Shin, Comment, Redressing Wounds: Finding A Legal
Framework to Remedy Racial Discrimination in Medical Care, 90 CAL. L. REv. 2047, 2097 (2002) (discussing
the difficulties in dislodging implicit bias from discretion in medicine); Michelle van Ryn & Somnath Saha,
Editorial, Exploring Unconscious Bias in Disparities Research and Medical Education, 306 J. AM. MED. ASS'N
995,996 (2011) (discussing how conscious focus can disrupt the adverse impact of implicit bias but how implicit
biases may impact patient experiences); Shankar Vedantam, The Color of Health Care: Diagnosing Bias in
Doctors, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2007, at A03 (discussing implicit bias concerns).
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depending on race in making myriad treatment judgment calls, from whether to
prescribe opiods to manage pain to whether to order procedures such as cardiac
catheterization to treat cardiovascular disease. 1 7 'Thus, while conferring therapeu-
tic discretion on police has powerful potential virtues, it also poses the prominent
potential risk of inequity in who benefits from rehabilitative policing.
The low-visibility nature of police decision-making on the streets also poses a
risk in police-led diversion programs. 172 In courts-even drug courts-there are
defense attorneys to guard a defendant's interests. ' 73 The nature of the American
adversarial judicial process supplies checks and balances on decision-making. In
contrast, the defendant has no representative to advocate his case for diversion to
treatment rather than booking for criminal processing in a police encounter.
Second, when prosecutors or judges decide whether to divert defendants to
treatment, they make decisions with a file on the defendant. 174
In contrast, officers face a comparative information deficit when making
decisions on the streets during an encounter with an offender. The officer can run
the defendant's information to see his or her criminal history but lack the
(sometimes) fuller file that is supplied to courts. These problems of conferring
therapeutic discretion on police should be taken into account in deciding how to
guide therapeutic discretion. They are not insurmountable and can be ameliorated.
The next section draws on insights from medicine and treatment courts in
exploring wags to mitigate the concerns.
III. ADDRESSING CONCERNS OVER AUTHORIZING POLICE TO ENGAGE IN
STREET DIVERSION
Discretion is not going away any time soon-nor should it-because despite its
potential dangers it is a necessary adjunct to a system that depends on human
judgment to dispense equitable context-tailored solutions. 7 5 Humans, not comput-
171. E.g., Mark J. Pletcher et al., Trends in Opiod Prescribing by Race/Ethnicity for Patients Seeking Care in
US Emergency Care Departments, 299 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 70, 70, 74-77 (2008) (discussing opiod prescribing by
emergency-room doctors); Kevin A. Schulman et al., The Effect of Race and Sex on Physicians'Recommenda-
tions for Cardiac Catheterization, 340 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 618, 623-24 (1999) (finding patient race and
gender affect doctors' decisions on whether to order cardiac catheterization). For more studies, see sources at
footnotes and 25, 170.
172. See Goldstein, supra note 146, at 572-80 (discussing the low-visibility nature of police decision-making
and difficulties in monitoring).
173. See, e.g., Boldt, supra note 85, 1249-60 (discussing dilemmas of defense attorney's role in drug courts);
Quinn, supra note 85, at 38, 46-47, 50 (discussing interactions between defense attorney, prosecutors and judges
in drug courts).
174. See, e.g., Hora et al., supra note 81, at 450-68 (discussing judicial decision-making in drug courts and the
referral process).
175. See, e.g., Ellen S. Podgor, Race-ing Prosecutor's Ethics Codes, 44 HARV. Civ. RTS-CIv. LIB. L. REv. 461,
474 (2009) (discussing how prosecutorial discretion can be wielded to exercise compassion and correct
injustices); William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 2037-39 (2008) (discussing the virtues
of open-textured standards in conferring discretion on juries to deliver contextualized mercy); cf Dan Markel,
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ers, police the street. There is still a market for the nuance and complexity of
human judgment-even with its imperfections-in responding to the huge factual
variation that human needs and social order present in the everyday work of
policing the streets and responding to calls. 176 The question is how best to guide
discretion to mitigate the risks of potential skews in therapeutic judgment and how
to maximize the cost benefits of rehabilitative policing.
This section addresses three major concerns and how to ameliorate them. First,
the section addresses concerns about the lack of protections such as attorney
representation and judicial supervision in pre-arrest street encounters. Second, the
section draws insights from medicine, social psychology, and treatment courts
about how to address concerns over skews in therapeutic discretion. The medical
and social psychology literature offer lessons on how to detect and mitigate the
risks of implicit bias, use data-driven monitoring in low-visibility contexts, and
improve decision-making based on self-reports and brief initial observations
through communication education. Third, recent data on drug court performance
offer counterintuitive insights about how we should expand the typical screening
eligibility criteria to help steer discretion and maximize the cost-benefits of street
diversion.
A. The Different Stakes in Street Diversion from Post-Arrest Diversion
As discussed in Part II.B.2, one of the concerns about police diversion is likely
to be that the protections and best practices in prosecutorial or judicial diversion
programs may be missing-and simply not tenable-in the street diversion
context. In the more familiar post-arrest diversion programs initiated by prosecuto-
rial or judicial decisionmakers, defendants frequently enjoy more protections. To
take a major example, after the commencement of formal proceedings, indigent
defendants have the Sixth Amendment right to consult with counsel at all critical
stages of the proceeding, including during post-arraignment police questioning. 1
77
Before the commencement of formal proceedings, however, the Sixth Amendment
does not attach. 178 Moreover, the right to counsel during custodial police interroga-
tion carved from the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against self-incrimination in
Miranda v. Arizona 179 does not apply during investigative stops on the street by
Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1437, 1441 (2004) (distinguishing from a retributivist's perspective
between equitable discretion and mercy animated by compassion).
176. Cf, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 346-47 (2001) (explaining officers must respond to
a vast array of situations in "the spur (and in the heat) of the moment"); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656
(1984) ("In a kaleidoscopic situation such as the one confronting these officers.., spontaneity rather than
adherence to a police manual is necessarily the order of the day.").
177. E.g., Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 211-12 (2008) (holding the Sixth Amendment attaches
after the initiation of formal adversarial proceedings and applies at critical stages thereafter); Patterson v. Illinois,
487 U.S. 285,290 (1988) (post-arraignment police interview).
178. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991).
179. 384 U.S. 436,470(1966).
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police short of arrest.'8° Thus, there is no right to counsel-and certainly unlikely
to be counsel at hand-to advise suspects on the street whether to agree to
diversion in lieu of arrest.
On the other hand, there is less need in the street diversion context for advice of
counsel precisely because there is no arrest. The choice in street diversion is
whether to cut someone a break and keep her out of criminal processing rather than
arrest. In contrast, a major concern surrounding post-arrest diversion programs is
that defendants-past the gateway of arrest and squarely in the criminal justice
system-who flunk out of diversion may be subject to more severe sanctions as
they are prosecuted and sentenced.' 8' The concern is important because frequently
the price of entry into post-arrest diversion programs such as drug courts are
admission of the elements of the crime and even guilty pleas-all involving
significant waiver of constitutional rights requiring the aid of counsel. 182 Indeed
nearly half of drug courts, for example, require diversion participants to stipulate
to the entry of a sentence if they flunk out.1 83 Because the price of entry is
expedited conviction in the event of drop-out, critics argue the impact of diversion
programs is to widen the net and catch more low-level offenders against whom
prosecutors might otherwise decline to pursue charges. 
184
In light of these concerns, the proposed revision to the American Law Institute's
influential Model Penal Code contains two new provisions on diversion programs
and safeguards.' 85 The proposed safeguards govern pre-charge prosecutor-
initiated diversion programs ("deferred prosecutions") and court-granted diversion
("deferred adjudication"). 186 The commentary to the proposed new provisions
specifically reference the controversies over net-widening and requiring relinquish-
ment of rights surrounding pre-charge prosecutorial diversion. 13 7 Currently, most
of the safeguards against these concerns are inserted in the draft provision on
prosecutorial pre-charge diversion-the earliest juncture at which most diversion
programs operate. The proposed provision requires consultation with counsel
180. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,436-37 (1984).
181. See, e.g., Josh Bowers, Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L. REV. 783, 790-94 (summarizing
studies indicating drug court drop-outs end up with more severe sentences).
182. See e.g., Janine M. Zweig et al., The Multi-Site Adult Drug Court Evaluation: What's Happening with
Drug Courts? A Portrait of Adult Drug Courts in 2004, URBAN INSTITUTE JUSTICE POLICY CENTER 40-42 (Nov.
2011), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/237110.pdf (reporting around two-thirds of drug
courts required waiver of constitutional rights).
183. Id. at 40-41.
184. E.g., Timothy Edwards, The Theory and Practice of Compulsory Drug Treatment in the Criminal Justice
System, 2000 Wis. L. REv. 283, 334-36; Morris B. Hoffman, The Drug Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1437,
1503-04 (2000); Michael M. O'Hear, Rethinking Drug Courts: Restorative Justice as a Response to Racial
Injustice, 20 STAN. L. & PoL'Y REV. 463,483-84 (2009).
185. Model Penal Code: Sentencing, Discussion Draft No. 4, THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, §§ 6.02A, 6.02B,
6-27 (Apr. 16, 2012) (unpublished draft) (on file with the author).
186. Id.
187. Id. § 6.02A(4), (5) & cmt. c.
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before entering into a deferred prosecution agreement and provides that "[d]e-
ferred prosecution agreements shall not be used in cases that the prosecutor would
otherwise not pursue for reasons of factual or legal insufficiency." 88 The provision
also limits deferred prosecution to cases where "there is probable cause to support
felony or misdemeanor charges and sufficient admissible evidence to support
conviction" to avoid net-widening to leverage admissions.' 89
In the street diversion context, having defense attorneys follow police is neither
practicable nor desirable because the cost and intrusion would shut down the
willingness to grant people who otherwise could be arrested the choice of
non-arrest and diversion to rehabilitation. Having defense attorneys present also is
less crucial-as long as diversion is not conditioned on a waiver of constitutional
rights such as the privilege against compelled self-incrimination by the require-
ment of admission to an offense. As for net-widening, some may be concerned that
police may use the hammer of arrest to coerce people into treatment, thus widening
the net of social control. This fear can be blunted by similarly specifying that street
diversion is limited to cases where there is probable cause to arrest and prohibiting
targeting in cases police otherwise would not pursue because of factual or legal
insufficiency. Also crucially, in street diversion without arrest, the price of flunking
out is ineligibility for future grants of grace from arrest-or at worst, arrest for the
offense that could have occurred anyway. Because the stakes are different in street
diversion so are the safeguards that are practicable and desirable for adaptation.
B. Ameliorating Skews in Therapeutic Judgment: Lessons from Medicine
Another looming fear is potential disparities in which groups get the benefit of
street diversion-an oft-raised concern in the drug court beneficiary context.' 90
Essentially, the fear is of skews and potential implicit biases in discretion. On this
important issue, insights from the medicine literature are illuminating.
While an analogy between the discretion of doctors and police may seem
unusual, it is worth exploring because the factors that influence differences in
doctors' treatment of patients also pose risks for officers' assessments about
whether someone on the street is amenable to diversion to treatment. For ex-
ample, studies have indicated skews in therapeutic judgment among doctors are
influenced by implicit biases and the perception that minorities are less likely
to be cooperative and comply with treatment terms. 191 Such factors may also
188. Id.
189. Id. § 6.02(2) & cmt. c.
190. See, e.g., id. § 6.02B cmt. I (noting the "oft-stated concern" that the benefits of drug courts and other
therapeutic courts "may be distributed in disparate or discriminatory ways" and "[miore general programs of
deferred adjudication may be vulnerable to the same suspicions").
191. See, e.g., Alexander R. Green et al., supra note 25, at 1235-36 (2007) (reporting findings on physician
implicit bias, including strong association of black patients as being "less cooperative" and skews in treatment
recommendations); Janie A. Sabin et al., Physician Implicit Attitudes and Stereotypes About Race and Quality of
Medical Care, 46 MED. CARE 678, 683 (2008) (finding among pediatricians less implicit bias than other kinds of
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impact officers' judgments about whether outgroup members are amenable to
diversion for treatment rather than jail-an important issue because amenability
for diversion is likely to be a criterion for selection, as it is in the LEAD protocol,
for example. 1
92
Medical researchers have been intensively searching for solutions to improve
therapeutic judgment, especially since the Institute of Medicine reported differ-
ences in how doctors treat patients-health care in addition to health status-
contribute to racial disparities in health and mortality.1 93 Though cognitive
dissonance regarding the belief one is providing evenhanded service may lead to
discounting of information to the contrary, among scientists, it has prompted the
desire to understand why and find interventions. 194 Insights from growing medical
and social psychology literature on how to improve judgment can inform ap-
proaches to educating and guiding police discretion in rehabilitative selection
mode. Three important insights are discussed here: (1) strategies for detecting and
counteracting personally-held unconscious biases; (2) quality-control monitoring
to offer checks on judgment; and (3) communication education to improve the
ability to make decisions based on brief observations and encounters.
1. Detecting and Defusing Implicit Bias
Insights from medical and social psychology studies are illuminating that
traditional antidiscrimination training, which aims to change conscious attitudes,
may be missing the point.1 95 Disparities in therapeutic judgment may occur even
when professionals earnestly believe they are acting in an evenhanded fashion
because of unconscious outgroup bias. 196 People may resist participating in
traditional anti-prejudice training because they genuinely believe they do not need
it and resent the implication they are biased despite their genuine belief they are
not.' 9 7 Rather than blame, the first step is to diagnose unconscious attitudes,
preferably in as confidential a context as possible to avoid resistance from fear of
exposure, then educate on strategies to counteract implicit biases. We can draw
lessons from medicine on the detection and defusing of implicit bias in therapeutic
decision-making.
Medical researchers have designed a way to assess the impact of implicit bias on
individual physicians' treatment judgment calls using the Implicit Association Test
doctors but still a moderate implicit association of European Americans rather than African Americans with
patient compliance).
192. See LEAD Protocol, supra note 1, at 3 (providing low-level drag offenders should presumptively be
referred for diversion unless in the officer's judgment the subject "does not appear amenable to diversion").
193. SMEDLEY ET AL., supra note 25, at 160-79.
194. See van Ryn & Saha, supra note 170, at, 995-96 (collecting studies).
195. See Dovidio et al., supra note 170, at 483.
196. Id.
197. Gordon Hodson, John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, The Aversive Form of Racism, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION: RACISM IN AMERICA 126-27 (Jean Lau Chin ed., 2004).
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(IAT).' 98 Designed and popularized by Anthony Greenwald and colleagues and
Mahzarin Banaji, the IAT has become an influential and widespread way to detect
unconscious negative perceptions of out-groups.' 99 In the racial attitudes IAT,
unconscious biases are measured by assessing in a timed test the ease or difficulty
one has in matching raced faces with positive and negative words.2 °°
At Harvard Medical School's Disparities Solutions Center, Alexander Green
and collaborators presented emergency room residents with a vignette in which a
50-year-old male comes to the emergency room with chest pain and an electrocar-
diogram suggesting a heart attack.20 Each vignette varies only in the picture of the
patient presented to the medical resident--drawn from two black and two white
images closely matched on attractiveness ratings and apparent age.20 2 The research-
ers found a strong association between the participants' implicit bias, as measured
by the IAT, and the likelihood of giving black patients a clot-busting treatment
called thrombolysis. 20 3 As the degree of implicit anti-black bias increased, the
likelihood of giving black patients thrombolysis decreased. 204 The study was the
first to find evidence directly supporting the oft-proposed hypothesis that implicit
bias influences therapeutic judgment, making physicians less likely to grant black
patients treatment.20 5
The study also provided intriguing insights on counteracting the impact of
implicit bias on therapeutic judgment. Among a smaller pool of participants
reporting some awareness of the nature of the study, physicians with higher
implicit bias were more rather than less likely to order thrombolysis for black
patients than physicians with low bias.20 6 The researchers inferred from this data
that "implicit bias can be recognized and modulated to counteract its effect on
treatment decisions" and that the IAT is a valuable tool toward this goal.207 An
approach to improving judgment and disparities could, for example, involve
confidentially administering IATs to decision makers to alert them to the risk of
198. Carmen R. Green et al., supra note 25, at 1237.
199. See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem,
and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REv. 4, 19-20 (1995) (calling for a method to detect unconscious stereotyping and
exploring potential methods); Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit
Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1472, 1476-77 (1998)
(presenting IAT); Janice A. Sabin et al., Physicians' Implicit and Explicit Attitudes About Race by MD Race,
Ethnicity, and Gender, 20 J. HEALTH CARE FOR THE POOR & UNDERSERVED 896, 899 (2009) (reporting that IAT is
"widely accepted as a measure of implicit social cognition because it achieves good reliability in comparison [to]
other implicit measures" and "has been the subject of over 450 peer-reviewed publications").
200. E.g., Greenwald et al., supra note 199, at 1465-66; Sabin et al., supra note 191, at 899.
201. Alexander R. Green et al., supra note 25, at 1233.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1235.
204. Id.
205. See id. at 1237 ("Whereas several studies have pointed to unconscious biases as one potential root cause
for racial and ethnic disparities in health care, this is the first evidence directly supporting this link.").
206. Id. at 1235, 1237.
207. Id. at 1237.
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bias so they can counteract it.20 8
Social psychology studies indicate people alerted to their potential implicit bias
in a nonthreatening way-and motivated to control it-can counteract the impact
of implicit bias on judgment.20 9 Just warning people to control stereotype bias may
be insufficient-and counterproductive.2 10 Studies are mixed: some have found
backfire effects from alerting people to bias and the need to consciously control it
whereas others have found debiasing effects. 2" The better approach is to combine
information about the need to counteract one's bias with training and assistance on
debiasing strategies.
Some de-biasing strategies that appear promising in the literature include
picturing counter-stereotypical outgroup members, asking decision makers to
reflect on whether their determination would be the same if the subject's race were
switched, or working with positive group representatives such as a cross-racial
partner or boss.21 2 For example, Brandon Stewart and Keith Payne found that
making subjects aware of bias and asking them to plan in advance to counteract the
bias-for example, commit to thinking the word "safe" when seeing a black face in
judging whether someone was reaching for a weapon-was an effective combined
strategy to decrease bias in decision-making.213 Moreover, there is some evidence
that officers can be trained out of the tendency for race to influence the judgment of
an attribute.2 t4 For example, officers asked to repeatedly perform simulations on
208. Id.
209. See, e.g., Irene V. Blair, The Malleability ofAutomatic Stereotypes and Prejudice, 6 PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCH. REV. 242, 240-55 (2002) (reviewing myriad studies on factors influencing the malleability of stereotypes,
including strategies of conscious suppression); Patricia G. Devine & Margo J. Monteith, Automaticity and
Control in Stereotyping, in DUAL PROCESS THEORIES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 340-41, 346-47 (Shelly Chaiken &
Yaacov Trope eds., 1999) (collecting studies on how automatically-activated stereotypes may be overridden in
motivated individuals exerting control by replacing stereotypes with individuated judgments); Susan T. Fiske,
Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination, in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357, 364 (Daniel T.
Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998) (discussing how individuals may control prejudice if alerted to the problem and
motivated to do so); Kristin A. Lane et al., Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REv. L. & SOC. Sci. 427,
437-38 (2007) (collecting studies where implicit bias has been shown to be malleable and suppressible).
210. See Brandon D. Stewart & B. Keith Payne, Bringing Automatic Stereotyping Under Control: Implemen-
tation Intentions as Efficient Means of Thought Control, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1332, 1333-43
(2008) (collecting and reviewing studies); Blair, supra note 209, at 248 (collecting mixed studies).
211. See Blair, supra note 209, at 248 (reviewing studies); Stewart & Payne, supra note 210, at 1343
(collecting studies).
212. See CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE COURTROOM 224 (2003)
(recommending race-switching jury instructions in cases where there is a risk race may influence jurors'
perceptions of reasonableness); Lane et al., supra note 209, at 438 (collecting studies on the power of interaction
and counter-stereotypical exposure and thinking;); B. Michelle Peruche & E. Ashby Plant, The Correlates of Law
Enforcement Officers' Automatic and Controlled Race-Based Responses to Criminal Suspects, 28 BASIC &
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 193, 194, 197-98 (2006) (discussing findings on how positive encounters with outgroup
members on the job and in the community decrease implicit bias); Stewart & Payne, supra note 210, at 1333
(collecting studies on efficacies de-biasing strategies).
213. Stewart & Payne, supra note 210, at 1336, 1343.
214. See, e.g., Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer's Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate
Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314,1326 (2002) (finding officers with
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judging whether someone is holding a weapon using a program where race is not
related to the presence of a weapon reduced their initial race-influenced mistaken
judgment calls.215 Moreover, researchers have found trained officers show signifi-
cantly less bias than members of the general public in deciding whether to shoot or
not shoot suspects in a computer simulation.21 6
Drawing from the insights of medical and social psychology researchers, a
strategy for educating officers in how to wield their rehabilitative sorting power
could apply a combination of confidential implicit bias testing coupled with
post-test education. Police are at once high-stakes and low-visibility decision
makers for whom implicit bias testing and follow-up training would be salutary,
bringing to light potential judgment skews about which the officer herself may not
be consciously aware.217
Currently, administration of the IAT in police training has not been enthusiasti-
cally embraced.2' 8 It is easy to see why officers would be wary. First, no one
(particularly in a profession under siege by accusations of racial bias) is particu-
larly eager to learn one is biased, even if it is unconscious. Second, it would be
tough to maintain total confidentiality of test results because under Giglio v. United
States, 19 the prosecution has a duty to disclose relevant impeachment information
for testifying witnesses-which might be construed to include high implicit bias
scores where a defense relates to a testifying officer's alleged bias, for example.
Recently, however, police departments are beginning to signal potential willing-
ness to be tested to improve police-community relations.22° Such training could be
a standardized part of the education in preparation for officers to wield rehabilita-
tive sorting power on the streets.221
firearms training showed the least bias among officers and civilians in simulations determining whether someone
is armed and whether to shoot); B. Keith Payne, Weapon Bias: Split-Second Decisions and Unintended
Stereotyping, 15 CURR. DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SC. 287, 290 (2006) (collecting studies); E. Ashby Plant &
B. Michelle Peruche, The Consequences of Race for Police Officers' Responses to Criminal Suspects, 16
PSYCHOL. SCI. 180, 290 (2005) (finding repeated computer simulations in which race was unrelated to whether a
subject was holding a weapon can help disassociate race from dangerousness).
215. Plant & Peruche, supra note 214, at 182.
216. Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot,
92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1006, 1015, 1020 (2007).
217. Cf Paul Butler, Rehnquist, Racism and Race Jurisprudence, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1019, 1042 (2006)
(arguing for the virtues of implicit bias testing of high-stakes criminal justice decision makers such as judges).
218. E.g., Jessie Magaliman, New Programs Tested to Find Hidden Bias in Police Work, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEws, (Nov. 17, 2008), http://www.policeone.comlchiefs-sheriffs/articles/1757629-New-programs-tested-to-find-
hidden-bias-in-police-work/.
219. 405 U.S. 150, 154(1971).
220. Magaliman, supra note 218; see also Tracey G. Gove, Implicit Bias and Law Enforcement, 78 POLICE
CHIEF MAO., 44,44-55 (2011) (detailing recent inroads of general training on the influence of implicit bias among
police officers).
221. See supra Part II.A. on the model of police selection power.
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2. A Check on Low-Visibility Discretion: Data-Driven Monitoring
Medicine, like policing, is a zone of low-visibility discretion, often without
counterbalancing actors in the room to check judgment. M. Gregg Bloche captured
the vast opaque discretion in American medicine: "Most of the time, physicians
exercise their broad discretion invisibly, making no record apart from clinical
progress notes and submission to utilization reviewers. 2 22 Many physicians'
offices have, however, begun deploying formal quality improvement programs
that collect and aggregate data to permit monitoring as a check on judgment.22 3
Medical researchers studying a group of physicians selected based on greater
interest and success in improving care for minority patients remarked on the fact
that more than half worked at practices with a formal quality improvement
program.224 Among physicians in practices with quality improvement programs,
more than half specifically collected and examined data on patient race and
ethnicity to monitor the quality of care and detect areas in need of improvement.225
A cognate to this approach in the rehabilitative policing context would be to
collect and regularly examine data regarding rehabilitative decision-making as a
check on judgment. Data collected could include the races and ethnicities of
people diverted by police compared to those sent to jail for drug-related offenses
and reasons for excluding certain drug offenders from treatment. Monitoring has
the triple benefit of (1) providing a data-driven check in a context where other
counterbalancing actors are not present; (2) serving as an early-warning system
shedding light in the opaque areas of street-level police sorting discretion; and (3)
giving officers additional motivation to self-scrutinize and suppress implicit biases
in judgments about whether to divert. A host of studies have illuminated the import
of motivation-whether stemming from internal belief systems, legal mandates or
professional incentives-in successfully suppressing the effects of implicit bias.226
222. M. Gregg Bloche, Race and Discretion in American Medicine, 1 YALE J. HEALTH PoL'Y L. & ETHICS 95,
102(2001).
223. See, e.g., J. Randall Curtis et al., Intensive Care Unit Quality Improvement: A "How-to" Guide for the
Interdisciplinary Team, 34 CRITICAL CARE MED. 211, 214-15 (2006) (discussing data collection and strategies for
changing behavior); Paul Glasziou, Greg Ogrinc & Steve Goodman, Can Evidence-Based Medicine and Clinical
Quality Improvement Learn from Eachother?, 20 BMJ QUALITY & SAFETY 13, 16 (2011) (arguing for teaching
future generations of medical clinicians evidence-based and quality-improvement practices).
224. Jared W. Klein et al., Physicians' Experiences and Opinions Regarding Strategies to Improve Care for
Minority Patients, 2 J. HEALTH DISPARITIES RES. & PRAc. 75, 83-84 (2008).
225. Id. at 84.
226. See, e.g., Jack Glaser & Eric D. Knowles, Implicit Motivation to Control Prejudice, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 164, 164-65, 168, 171 (2008) (collecting studies indicating that nonconscious motivation to
control prejudice, for example "chronic egalitarianism," can inhibit implicit bias); Hodson, Dovidio & Gaertner,
supra note 197, at 127-29 (collecting studies on how to activate motivations to suppress biases); Christine Jolls &
Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969, 986-91 (2006) (examining how the law can
motivate debiasing); cf Leslie R. M. Hausmann & Carey S. Ryan, Effects of External and Internal Motivation to
Control Prejudice and Implicit Prejudice: The Mediating Role of Efforts to Control Prejudiced Responses, 26
BASIC & APPLIED PSYCH. 215, 216-17, 223 (2004) (finding the internal motivations to suppress implicit bias are
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Disparities in who is diverted to treatment rather than jail do not necessarily
conclusively demonstrate implicit bias at play. As Richard Banks has argued,
skews by subject's race may be based on factors other than bias. 227 For example,
outside of the controlled conditions of studies, on the street, officers may have
reason to react based on race in a harsh reality where data indicates that blacks are
five times as likely to shoot officers and four times as likely to be shot by
officers. 228 Disproportionalities in beneficiaries of rehabilitative policing might be
due to implicit bias-but might also be due to criteria for selection of eligible
people for diversion. As discussed in Part III.B., prevalent screening criteria by
type of eligible offense and criminal history may generate racial skews in
eligibility. Nonetheless, monitoring would alert police departments and the com-
munity to assess the reasons why there are disparities in beneficiaries.
Such data-driven surveillance of police practices is practicable-and indeed
increasingly becoming prevalent.229 Many states have introduced legislation
requiring data collection on people stopped and searched in traffic.23° Moreover, a
common remedy to settle Justice Department investigations of police departments
for civil rights violations is data collection regarding races of suspects stopped and
searched and automated monitoring of officer behavior.231 Even absent suit or
legislation, some police departments have begun voluntarily collecting data in
efforts to self-monitor.232 Thus, quality-control systems that track data such as the
apparent race, ethnicity or national origin of drug offenders diverted-and not
diverted-by police are feasible and consistent with the contemporary trend in
police regulation.
more effective than external motivations, which may backfire through ironic processing and lead to greater
manifestation of attention to stereotypes on implicit association tests).
227. R. Richard Banks, Jennifer L. Eberhardt & Lee Ross, Discrimination and Implicit Bias in a Racially
Unequal Society, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1180 (2006).
228. Id. (citing data from JODI M. BROWN & PATRICK A. LANGAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, Policing and Homicide, 1976-98: Justifiable Homicide by Police, Police Officers Murdered by Felons
26(2001)).
229. Mary D. Fan, Panopticism for Police: Structural Reform Bargaining and Police Regulation by
Data-Driven Surveillance, 87 WASH. L. REV. 93, 136 (2012).
230. Michael E. Buerger & Amy Farrell, The Evidence of Racial Profiling: Interpreting Documented and
Unofficial Sources, 5 POLICE Q. 272, 273-74 (2002).
231. See, e.g., United States v. City of Detroit, No. 03-72258, Consent Judgment, Use of Force and Arrest and
Witness Detention, 78-90, 124-30, (E.D. Mich. June 12, 2003) (requiring police department to establish a
risk-management database tracking officer conduct with the capacity to raise red flags at certain data thresholds);
United States v. City of Los Angeles, No. Civil 00-11769, Consent Decree, 1 55-69, 104-05 (C.D. Cal. June 15,
2001) (requiring officers to fill out a written or electronic report for each use of force incident; documentation of
the apparent race, ethnicity or national origin of people stopped and searched and audits of reports for canned
language); United States v. New Jersey, No. Civil 99-5970, Consent Decree, 29, 32, 36-37 (D.N.J. Dec. 30,
1999) (requiring reporting of races of people stopped and searched and review of videotapes of stops on
random-selection basis).
232. Buerger & Farrell, supra note 230, at 273.
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3. Improving Information Deficits: Cultivating Communicative Input
Police on the street sorting people for rehabilitation rather than arrest will have
to rely on their observations in a brief encounter, criminal records checks, and the
individual's statements. Such an approach bases decision-making on different
inputs than that before judges and prosecutors because the officer lacks a case file
on the defendant. Whether this distinction amounts to a difference is arguable
because files before courts and prosecutors sometimes amount to little more than a
rap sheet. On the other hand, the officer gets arguably more information in the
sense that the offender is observed in a communicative context whereas once the
criminal process starts, defendants are typically silent and sanitized, providing less
contextual information.233 Moreover, in communities where officers know repeat
offenders with drug problems, such as Belltown, the beat cops may know the
subject a lot better than any judge or prosecutor ever will. 234
Insights from medicine can inform the practice of making judgments about
amenability to treatment based on observations and questioning in a brief encoun-
ter. Doctors also have to make therapeutic judgments in brief encounters-an
average of about seventeen minutes long-often based on little more than
observations and patient self-reports and responses to questions.23 5 Communica
tion is crucial to getting the best inputs for judgment in such decision-making
contexts.2 36 Where communication is complicated by cross-group misunderstand-
ings and mistrust, the difficulties can contribute to disparities in selection for
treatment.23 7
Studies in medicine have indicated that assessments of characteristics such as
potential cooperativeness and amenability for treatment may be impacted by the
233. See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1449, 1459-72 (2005) (describing how defendants are systematically silenced in the criminal justice system).
234. See, e.g., Pulkkinen supra note 2, atA1 (discussing repeat encounters).
235. See, e.g., DEBRA L. ROTER & JUDITH A. HALL, DOCTORS TALKING WITH PATIENTS/PATIENTS TALKING WITH
DOCTORS 112 (2006) (discussing import of communication in physician decision-making and average appoint-
ment times); see also, e.g., Benjamin H. Natelson, Lost in a System Where Doctors Don't Want to Listen, WASH.
POST, Aug. 3, 2008, at B03 (discussing the challenges of physician decision-making).
236. See, e.g., Gregory Makoul & Theo Schofield, Communication Teaching and Assessment in Medical
Education: An International Consensus Statement, 37 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING 191, 192-94 (1999),
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0738399199000233 - AFF1 (discussing consensus statement
on the import of communication and communication education to the quality of medical decision-making).
237. See e.g., AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, NATIONAL HEALTH DISPARITIES REPORT, 2007,
at 85-86 (Feb. 2008) (reporting on minority patients' concems with provider communication styles and impact on
treatment); Mary K. Askim-Lovseth & Adriana Aldana, Looking Beyond "Affordable" Health Care: Cultural
Understanding and Sensitivity-Necessities in Addressing the Health Care Disparities of the U.S. Hispanic
Population, 27 HEALTH MARKETING Q. 354, 365-66, 377-78 (2010) (arguing cultural factors beyond language
barriers impact communication with Hispanic patients and that physician education regarding cross-cultural ways
of establishing rapport would contribute to improving disparities); Rachel L. Johnson et al., Racial and Ethnic
Differences in Patient Perceptions of Bias and Cultural Competence in Health Care, J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 101,
101-02, 108 (2004) (discussing how perceptions of minority patients that they are treated unfairly and
disrespectfully by doctors undermine the quality of care).
2013]
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
authoritarian communication styles that doctors deploy with minority group
members and resulting mistrust and miscommunication.238 For example, Rachel
Johnson and colleagues coded interactions between white doctors and black
patients and found physicians were 23 percent more verbally dominant, 33 percent
less patient-centered in communication, and demonstrated less positive demeanor
in encounters with black patients.239 Minority patients who believe they are being
treated with discrimination or disrespect may respond with mistrust and seeming
noncooperation.24 ° Moreover, even if minorities are merely asking questions they
may be perceived as challenging authority.241 For example, Diana Burgess and
collaborators found a tendency for doctors to perceive minorities who ask
questions about treatment recommendations as challenging their medical exper-
tise, whereas whites who ask questions were viewed as legitimately trying to better
understand the recommendation. 2
These insights may inform the training and education of police in assessing
minorities for suitability for referral to treatment. Empirical studies of police
behavior have found that officers are more likely to arrest when they perceive their
authority is being challenged.243 In training officers in communicating to suspects
about the option of street diversion, it is important to inculcate the understanding
that confusion and questioning about options is not a challenge to authority.
Officers should also be trained to guard against aggravating mistrust among
minority communities by adopting more authoritarian communication styles with
people of color. The literature is replete with findings of minority group mistrust of
police. 244 This mistrust further complicates communication and aggravates dispari-
ties in the perception of a subject's risk level and likelihood of being amenable and
cooperative in treatment. 245 Outgroup members who mistrust police "may engage
in more belligerent behavior, including 'talking back' to police officers, and-in a
238. E.g., Johnson et al., supra note 237, at 102, 107-08.
239. Rachel L. Johnson et al., Patient Race/Ethnicity and Quality of Patient-Physician Communication During
Medical Visits, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTh 2084, 2087-89 (2004).
240. See Janet K. Shim, Cultural Health Capital: A Theoretical Approach to Understanding Health Care
Interactions and the Dynamics of Unequal Treatment, 51 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAV. 1, 10 (2010) (collecting
studies).
241. Id.
242. Diana J. Burgess et al., Understanding the Provider Contribution to Race/Ethnicity Disparities in Pain
Treatment: Insights from Dual Process Models of Stereotyping, 7 PAIN MED. 119, 119-20, 128 (2006).
243. E.g., Douglas A. Smith & Christy A. Visher, Street-Level Justice: Situational Determinants of Police
Arrest Decisions, 29 Soc. PROBS. 167, 175 (1981).
244. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 n.ll, 30, 35 (1968) (noting friction between police and minority
communities); Ronald Weitzer & Steven A. Tuch, Race and Perceptions of Police Misconduct, 51 SOC. PROBS.
305, 305-07, 323-24 (2004) (collecting studies documenting that minorities are more likely to have negative
views of police than whites and exploring how police-minority interactions, among other factors, fuel the negative
perceptions).
245. See, e.g., Michael D. Reisig et al., Suspect Disrespect Toward the Police, 21 JusTIcE Q. 241, 241-43,
264-67 (2004) (describing how mistrust and feelings of police racism fuels communication complications that
lead to escalation of encounters).
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vicious cycle-this belligerence may prompt more severe use of force by po-
lice."24 6 Mitigating these communication and cultural barriers are important to
accurately gauging whether someone is amenable to diversion to treatment.
Reconfiguring officers' powers to include offering drug offenders the option to
go to treatment rather than jail puts officers in a communicative role where
effective communication matters more than in the past. The law governing
traditional policing evinces little care that the offender on the street understands his
rights or options.247 A prime example comes in the law of consent searches:
constitutional criminal procedure does not require one to understand there is an
alternative besides assenting to police to find valid consent. 248 Indeed, in criminal
investigations there is an incentive to be obscure to better acquire consent.249 In
contrast, when officers are given the power to offer drug offenders the option to
choose treatment rather than arrest, effective communication skills become much
more important.
To improve the ability of officers in establishing cross-cultural rapport, insights
from proposed improvements to the training and communication styles of physi-
cian can be instructive.250 For example, officers, like doctors, would be more
effective cross-cultural communicators if educated about cultural norms in body
language, such as prolonged eye contact being perceived as a challenge, and that
certain body language, such as eye contact avoidance, does not necessarily mean
disrespect, dissembling, or avoidance.2 5 ' The goal is to better inform the therapeu-
tic judgment that will steer rehabilitative policing and street diversion away from
the criminal justice system.
C. Including More Serious Offenders in Rehab: Lessons from Drug Courts
Ultimately, the most important tools for steering discretion that lawmakers can
control directly are the guidelines for choosing who is eligible for street diversion.
246. Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line, Police Officers and Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot,
92 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PsYcH. 1006, 1006-07 (2007).
247. See, e.g., Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 256 (1991) (Marshall J., dissenting) (explaining the Supreme
Court's criminal procedure doctrine permits "the police to capitalize on the ignorance of citizens so as to
accomplish by subterfuge what they could not achieve by relying only on the knowing relinquishment of
constitutional rights"); Mary D. Fan, The Police Gamesmanship Dilemma in Criminal Procedure, 44 UC DAvis L.
REV. 1407, 1423 (2011) (discussing how the court's doctrines permit police plenty of latitude to game the public's
lack of familiarity with the full scope of their rights).
248. E.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 206-07 (2002), Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996);
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 243 (1973).
249. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 256 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Fan, supra note 247, at 1423.
250. Studies in medicine on improving communication and compliance have, for example, explored tech-
niques such as ensuring understanding by asking people in a nonthreatening way to "teach back" what they have
been told. E.g., Anita D. Misra-Hebert & J. Harry Isaacson, Overcoming Health Disparities Via Better
Cross-Cultural Communication and Health Literacy, 79 CLEVE. CLINIC J. MED. 127, 131 (2012).
251. See, e.g., Johnson et al., supra note 239, at 2087-89 (advocating for education about cultural patterns of
communication such as eye contact avoidance and the meaning of prolonged eye contact).
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The lessons from more than two decades of experience with drug courts offers a
counterintuitive insight about eligibility criteria-letting in more serious offenders
would have greater public safety and cost savings pay-offs.252
A prevalent approach among drug courts and diversion programs is to select for
minor offenders and screen out those with prior violent felony convictions or who
are facing drug distribution rather than possession charges.253 A problem with this
approach is that those most in need of addiction treatment may be screened out,
while "chippers"---casual users blessed with the brain chemistry to better with-
stand addiction-play the role of addict to get the sentencing benefit.2 54 Expensive
treatment dollars are thus not maximized and may be wasted on those who do not
need the program. Indeed, Sheryl Kubiak and colleagues found many admitted
into specialty substance abuse treatment programs post-arrest do not meet the
diagnostic criteria for having a substance abuse disorder.255 There is a great need
among arrestees for treatment; 44.8 percent of arrestees met the criteria for having
a substance abuse disorder.2 56 But only a small fraction of offenders who actually
have a substance abuse disorder get it. 257 Screening criteria create the unintended
consequence of spending expensive treatment dollars on the wrong people.
Moreover, the largest and just recently completed study of drug courts to date
found the greatest cost savings and public safety benefits come from drug court
participation by offenders who commit more serious socially costly crimes.2 58 The
multiyear study of twenty-three programs explained while drug courts prevent a
substantial amount of future reoffending, most crimes-particularly "victimless"
crimes such as drug use or possession-have small social costs and thus smaller
payoffs when prevented 9.25  The study's finding that on average, the drug court
programs returned a net benefit of $5,680 to $6,208 per participant was driven by
success with relatively few individuals who commit the most serious crimes,
particularly violent crimes.2 60 In light of findings that "drug court programs work
equally well for clients with varying criminal histories and may even work better
252. See, e.g., ROSSMAN ET AL., supra note 87, at 258-61 (finding that the greatest public safety and cost
savings gains from drug courts come from reducing reoffending among people with a history of violent offenses).
253. O'Hear, supra note 184, at 478. There are exceptions-some treatment courts have begun to take a wider
range of people with more serious criminal histories. Allegra M. McLeod, Decarceration Courts: Possibilities
and Perils of a Shifting Criminal Law, 100 GEo. L.J. 1587, 1606-1608 (2012)
254. Josh Bowers, Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L. REV. 783, 785, 801-02 (2008); Morris B.
Hoffman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Neo-Rehabilitationism, and Judicial Collectivism: The Least Dangerous
Branch Becomes Most Dangerous, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2063, 2069 n.25 (2002); Eric J. Miller, Embracing
Addiction: Drug Courts and the False Promise of Judicial Interventionism, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1479, 1568-69
(2004).
255. See Kubiak et al., supra note 104, at 21-22.
256. Id. at 18.
257. Id. at 21-22.
258. See RoSSMAN ET AL., supra note 87, at 257, 265.
259. Id. at 258.
260. Id.
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in terms of preventing crime for those with violent offense histories" the study
recommended:
Federal funders and more local policymakers may want to encourage drug
courts to expand eligibility to include more serious offenders. The most
efficient use of resources is to keep people with the potential for committing
the more serious crimes from doing so. Drug courts can help those with more
serious offenders, and funders will see a greater net benefit from their
funding.26 '
There is a convergence of majority and minority interests in modifying the
screening criteria. The eligibility criteria based on criminal history and the nature
of the drug offense operates to the disadvantage of minorities, particularly
African-Americans, in two ways. 262 First, African-Americans drug offenders have
a higher probability of having a disqualifying prior conviction because of the
general disproportionality in arrests, investigations and convictions.26 3 Second,
African-Americans have a greater likelihood of being disqualified based on the
nature of the drug offense as sale or manufacturing rather than use or possession.
While disproportionality in arrests of African-Americans is substantial for drug
offenses overall, the disproportionality is particularly great-at four times the
white rate-when it comes to arrests for drug sale or manufacture. 26 Yet many
screening rules, including the LEAD protocol, for example, screen out manufactur-
ing or sale drug offenders to limit diversion to lesser drug offenders.26 5 Maintain-
ing this seemingly race-neutral criterion may aggravate disparities in who gets to
benefit from street diversion and who is left out.
Thus there is a convergence between majority interests in spending money more
wisely to maximize long-term benefits and minority interests in ameliorating the
disproportionate impact of screening criteria. A good idea in principle is not
enough of course. Political realities must always be considered in criminal justice
reform. If a diverted offender commits a salient violent crime, police and
261. Id. at 265.
262. It would be desirable to assess disproportionality for Hispanics -the largest and fastest-growing minority
group in the United States. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, OVERVIEW OF RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: 2010, at 4 tbl.l
(Mar. 2011) (on size of the Hispanic population). Unfortunately, the task is impeded by variations in data
collection and the failure to disaggregate Hispanics from non-Hispanic whites. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
ARRESTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980-2009, at 2 tbl. I (Sept. 2011) (presenting state and federal arrest data and
subsuming Hispanics in the general White category).
263. See O'HEAR, supra note 184, at 479-80 (analyzing raced consequences of drug courts); cf, e.g., Equal
Employment Opp'y Comm'n, EEOC Policy Statement on the Issue of Conviction Records under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1982) (Feb. 4, 1987) (explaining "an employer's
policy or practice of excluding individuals from employment on the basis of their conviction records has an
adverse impact on Blacks and Hispanics in light of statistics showing that they are convicted at a rate
disproportionately greater than their representation in the population").
264. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ARRESTS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 262, at 13. In contrast, the
disproportionality level of the black arrest rate for possession or use offenses is three times the white rate. Id.
265. LEAD Protocol, supra note 1, at 3.
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policymakers risk suffering backlash for "going easy" on the individual and
"setting him loose on society. '266 Allowing more serious offenders into street
diversion programs will take political courage-and perhaps encouragement
through federal grant funding bonuses for jurisdictions brave enough to take the
risk. Not only would incentives in federal grant programs help offset fears of
backlash, it would also dilute the risk to local lawmakers and policymakers, who
can point the finger at the federal government's funding incentives.267 Law and
regulations can change the social meaning and context of practices to make them
more widespread. 268 Now is a good time for the dawning of political courage,
made all the more palatable by empirical support for the proposition that expand-
ing eligibility can realize greater cost and public safety benefits in the long run.269
CONCLUSION
The approach of rehabilitative policing gives police a third option besides the
all-or-nothing choice of formal criminal processing or release without constraints
against reoffending. Rather than just serving as the muscular arm of the incarcera-
tive state, officers can be part of the solution as states engage in decarceration and
drug criminalization reform efforts. Major reform efforts have largely focused on
adjusting sentences and reimagining the role of prosecutors and judges. While
these innovations have been salutary, they typically operate after arrest and
booking, when the criminal process-with its costs to the system and the
offender-has kicked in. In contrast, police are the crucial gatekeepers at the
entryway to the criminal justice system, deciding whether to book someone into
criminal processing at all.
The crucial role of police in diversion to alternatives to incarceration has been
underutilized in the fomentation of reforms reimagining traditional criminal
justice roles. Part of this is a hangover from the longstanding scholarly mistrust of
police and conferring discretion on police. Yet even some of the most influential
scholars in portraying police as adversarial combatants intensely resistant to
266. Myriad examples come from the early release and clemency contexts. See, e.g., Vincent Carroll, Realities
of Early Release, DENVER POST, Dec. 6, 2009, at 3D (explaining that policymakers face political dangers if a
prisoner released early "goes berserk" and commits horrific crimes, such as those committed by prisoners to
whom Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee granted clemency); Manny Fernandez & Alison Leigh Cowan, When
Horror Came to a Connecticut Family, N.Y TIMES, Aug. 7, 2007, at Al (chronicling horror and backlash when
two 'career criminals' released early raped, robbed and then murdered a family); Editorial, Prison Chief Is Victim
of Political Games, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sept. 3, 2010 (describing allegations and backlash surrounding an early
release program that lead to firing of an official who instituted early release program); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
THE LAWS OF FEAR 69 (2005) (explaining how highly salient and emotionally-charged events can steer policy
despite low probability).
267. Compare this to Cass Sunstein's example of two hockey players who can say they are wearing helmets
not because they are wimps but because the government is making them do it (even though secretly they want to
protect their brains too). Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 948 (1996).
268. Id.
269. See supra Part I. A.
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change acknowledge that innovation can happen-if hard experience drives home
to police forces the need for change.2 7 0 A confluence of conditions-overstrained
budgets, criminogenic consequences of high incarceration and drug war fa-
tigue-is driving home the need for change to stakeholders across traditional
divides. Now is an opportune time to develop a model of public health policing for
drug offenders and safeguards to govern police discretion in choosing the benefi-
ciaries of such a treatment-based approach.
270. See, e.g., JEROME SKOLNICK & DAVID H. BAYLEY, THE NEW BLUE LINE: POLICE INNOVATION IN SIX
AMERICAN CITIES 211-12 (1986) (explaining that though police are insular, fiercely resistant to change, and
possessed of a we-they mentality that hardly makes them suitable to be community organizers, a gut realization
that traditional policing is not working to reduce crime is leading police to innovate toward community policing).
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